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ur any diminishing effects from lower population growth. In fact, 
rising expectations in many areas can be realised only if population 
growth is slowed (Corsa and Oakley 1979, p. 55). 
On the whole, one may conclude that rapid population growth 
generally leads to a quality of life that is lower than can be expected 
from slower population growth. Most of the effects in the relationahip 
between population growth and the quality of life are the result of a 
limited ability to expand productivity and total output due to the need 
for duplicating basic needs, so that the quality of life either declines 
absolutely or is relatively lower than otherwise. 
Perhaps the most visible consequence of the change in the age- 
structure which surfaced clearly in the immediate post-war period is 
the heavy pressures it places on the educational system and subsequently 
in the labour market. The available statistical evidence shows some 
improvement in the unemployment problem experienced by youths but it is 
nevertheless evident that the growth of productive capacity has not been 
fast enough to absorb the young people into the labour market. Youth 
unemployment, which is now a major social issue in the developed 
countries (see Psacharopoulos 1980), remains problematic since 
independence.? 
Table 1 gives a summary picture of the problem of youth unemployment 
in Malaysia. Though the number of young unemployed has increased 
(23.0 percent between 1967 and 1976) far less than that of the older 
cohorts (9k.1 percent for those aged 25 to 64), the percentage of youth 
unemployment relative to overall unemployment remains high compared to 
those in the developed countries (see Psacharopoulos 1980). The 
frequency has always been at least around the two-third mark - a 
statistic which policy-makers can hardly ignore. The problem here is 
compounded by the existence of a relationship between education and 
unemployment. 
Disaggregation of unemployment by educational level gives the 
clue that unemployment may in some way be related to education. Within 
the context of the changing age-structure, data on youth unemployment 
by educational level should form the basis for analysis. Unfortunately, 
in the case of Malaysia, such data are not readily available. However, 
to the extent that youth unemployment accounts for two-thirds of all 
unemployment, the available data showing total unemployment by educational 
4 
economic senae since they include depreciation which bears neither a 
technical nor a behavioural relation to net capacity change (Crosson 
1966, p. 57). 
It must be acknowledged that the above type of projection model 
has a number of statistical weaknesses when used in LDC's but it does 
show that with a high population growth a modest increase in per 
capita income will require investsent ratios well beyond the capacity 
of most LDCis (Lis 1973, p. 72). 
Coale and Hoover (1958) have argued that population growth 
per se does not increase the supply of investable resources. Where 
the supply of capital is inelastic a higher rate of population growth 
implies that significant portions of the available capital are detoured 
from productive investment to meet immediate social needs. For instance, 
rapid population growth compounded with the typical LDC age pyramid means 
that the number and proportion of young people to be educated increases 
just as capital is needed for projects with short-term economic returns. 
If large portions of government expenditures have to go to education or 
other forms of investment with only long-term returns, then capital for 
direct, quick return development is necessarily limited and reinvestment 
is restricted. This assumption of an inelastic supply of capital is 
more realistic than one which claims massive unused resources in LDC's 
(Ness 1963). It is also important to distinguish between potential 
resources and actual resources. For the former to materialise more 
capital and entrepreneurship may be required than is available at the 
moment (Lim 1973, p. 72). 
Contrary points of view (e.g. Clark 1968) about the relationship 
between population growth and GNP should be mentioned. One argument 
is that increasing population could allow greater specialization - a 
step towards higher per capita productivity. However, Corsa and 
Oakley (1979) have argued that nutrition and training have more 
influence on the capacity of an economy to specialize than the 
growing numbers in the labour force. A second argument is that rapid 
population growth could be 'the principal motive force' of agricultural 
revolutions (Boserup 1965, Clark 1968). The argument is that population 
pressures will call forth people's beat efforts. However, it must be 
'realised that it is not only population that exerts pressure for change. 
Because of the multiplier effect, rising expectations will easily take 
3 
instance, the mean number of children desired has declined from 5.1 in 
1966/67 to 4.4 in 1974. There has aleo been a significant increase in 
the percentage of currently married women with knowledge of family 
planning; the proportion increased from 44 percent in 1966/67 to 
92 percent in 1974. Another clear indication of the knowledge and 
practice of family planning is the increase in the proportion of 
currently married women who have ever used contraception from 14.3 percent 
(currently using 8.8 percent) in 1966/67 to 53.2 percent (35.5 percent) 
in 1974 (see Chander, et.al. 1977). It is apparent that family planning 
and 'population control' have come a fair distance since the establishment 
of the National Family Planning Board (NFPB) in 1966. However, the 
impact of a decline in fertility now will not be felt on the size of 
the labour force for almost a generation. In the meantime the 
pressures from the three pertinent demographic factors sustained over 
a relatively long period on the economy as a whole and on Malaysia's 
ultimate, yet most abstract, goal of national unity will have to be 
grappled with. 
II The Socio-Economic Consequences 
The pressures that the three demographic factors exert on the 
economy can be seen very clearly in the attempts by the government to 
raise the quality of life of the people.5 At the overall level, and 
taking GNP as a basic indicator of the quality of life, the preponderance 
of thought is that rapid population growth has a negative effect on 
Per capita GNP. Grovirth in GNP requires both capital as well as labour, 
but with rapid population growth it is unlikely that infusions of 
capital will keep pace. For instance, with a population growth rate 
of 2.5 percent - as has been indicated for Malaysia - the level of 
capital formation required to maintain the same per capita GNP will, 
on the assumption of an incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) between 
3 and 4, be between 7.5 to 10.0 percent of the GNP.6 If the government 
decides to increase per capita income by a target rate of 5.4 percent 
per annum (see Malaysia 1979, p. 22) then GNP will have to increase 
by just over 8 percent, and the investment ratio, with the same range 
of values for the ICOR, wOuld be between 24.1 to 32.1 percent. As it 
stands, Malaysia's gross fixed capital formation (26 percent of GNP) 
only just makes it to this range, but then gross figures do not make 
2 
structure (see Chander, eteal. 1977, pp. 9-14) in the period prior 
to independence. As the rate of natural increase became a more important 
determinant of population growth than migration the age-structure changed. 
The typical age pyramid of a high rate of natural increase has become 
apparent since censal year 1957. Compared to 1931, say, the age- 
structure in 1975 is young with 41 percent of the population under 
15 years - more in line with the typical age pyramid for LDC's. The 
projected trend from 1970-90 shows that unless fertility declines by 
about 30 percent during the period the age-structure in 1990 will be 
quite similar to that of 1970 (see Department of Statistics 1974). Though 
this appears likely the population will remain relatively young compared 
with those of the DC's by 1990.4 
Third, and perhaps the most obvious of colonial legacies, is the 
ethnic composition of the country. Prior to the advent of the British 
the country was populated mainly by Malaya who had emigrated from mainland 
Asia. However, with the coming of the British the more or less singular 
society was transformed into a plural society (see Smith 1952, Caldwell 
1961). Current estimates show a multi-racial society consisting of a 
simple majority of Malaya (53.3 percent) and two large minorities - 
the Chinese (35.4 percent) and Indians (10.5 percent). Two pertinent 
points in conjunction with the demographic composition of the population 
ehould be noted. The ethnic distribution of the population between 
urban and rural areas shows great variations in the degrees of 
urbanization between the various racial groups. The Chinese show the 
greatest degree of urbanization with 50.8 percent of the population 
residing in urban areas in 1975. The corresponding percentages for the 
Malaya and Indians are 18.0 and 37.8, respectively. The second pertinent 
point here lies on the political level. With their exit the British 
entrusted the Malaya with the political power in the country. This 
they still maintain by virtue of the demographic distribution of the 
ethnic groups, as stated above,. and an electoral weighting system in 
the allocation of votes which favours the predominantly rural, Malay 
areas. 
As stated above, the statistical evidence Shows that a secular 
decline in fertility has set in. In fact the latest available report 
shows promising trends in terms of general attitudes towards family 
planning and the knowledge and use of contraceptive devices. For 
CHAPTER I 
POPULATION GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF EDUCATION 
IN MALAYSIA 
I Three Pertinent Demographic Factors 
Time-series demographic data show very vividly the major problems 
confronting Malaysia1 which have become major facts of the country's 
political and economic life. The three major factors which are of 
considerable importance in this context may be directly or indirectly 
attributed to the country's colonial heritage. 
In the intercensal years, 1911-21, 1921-31, 1931-47, 1947-57 and 
1957-70, the annual growth rates in population were about 2.4 percent, 
3.0 percent, 1.8 percent, 2.8 percent, and 2.9 percent, respectively.2 
These rates, apart from the dip in the war years, are comparatively 
high by international standards. Based on current population estimates 
it is indicated that the population will continue to register a high 
annual growth rate of 2.5 percent, implying that the population will 
double in 27.7 years.3 Even with effective family planning the 
population will exceed the 20 million mark by the year 2000; about 
47 percent more than the 13.6 million estimated in 1980 for all 
Malaysia. A more pertinent point here relates to the underlying 
cause of the high annual rates of growth. The increase in population 
during the pre-war period was accounted for largely by the heavy net 
immigration which reached a peak in 1937. As a prelude to the 
economic development of the country as a supplier of primary commodities 
for the United Kingdom, the British actively encouraged the immigration 
of large numbers of Chinese and Indiana into Malaysia (see Ooi 1963). 
With the passage of time, mass immigration ceased and the natural 
increase in population became a significantly more important factor. 
Since independence in 1957 the annual rate of growth has come very 
close to that of the natural increase indicating that net migration 
is now a negligible factor in population growth. The momentum for 
rapid population growth now lies within the population itself. 
The second major factor relates to the age-structure of the 
population. As stated above, the population of the country was, 
unlike the population of many LDC's, heavily influenced by migratory 
movements until after the war. This gave rise to a typical age- 
level should be a good approximation of youth unemployment in relation 
to educational attainment. Table 2 shows the changing pattern quite 
clearly. Malaysia appears to have 'developed' a pool of relatively well 
educated unemployed. In 1967/68 the relative frequency of unemployed 
with a minimum of lower-secondary education was 35 percent but by 1976 
the relative frequency had increased to 50 percent. For those with 
tertiary education the relative frequency rose fourfold, from 0.4 percent 
to 1.6 percent in the same period. 
A host of theoretical reasons have been forwarded to explain 
educated youth unemployment (see Magnussen 1979). The most common is 
that of a mismatch between supply and demand. Basically this line of 
reasoning maintains that the educational system (supply side) does not 
adequately prepare its graduates for the world of work (demand side). 
This is also, perhaps, the prevailing view in Malaysia, or at least 
among the educational authorities (see Ministry of Education 1971). 
However, as Psacharopoulos (1980) argues, this is a rather simplistic 
view; if nothing else, it merely restates the problem in different 
words. 
Another economic reasoning comes under the broad label of 
'job search'. This maintains that family background (financial 
structure) and the existing wage structure (plus the cost of job 
search) might be such as to induce some kinds of graduates to remain 
unemployed over longer periods relative to others, thus contributing 
to the overall problem of youth unemployment. In other words, the 
private rate of return to certain family background and educational 
qualifications might be sufficiently high to enable certain categories 
of individuals to 'afford' longer spells of unemployment. 
Sociological reasons also exist which suggest that certain graduates 
might not be prepared to accept any kind of jobs, regardless of the 
financial returns. The available evidence in Malaysia shows an overall 
preference for white collar jobs at times when blue collar job vacancies 
abound (see Department of Statistics 1970, and Mazumdar 1975). Clearly, 
job attitudes cultivated in school (as distinct from educational training 
for the world of work) and in the family are important determinants of 
job search and therefore the problem of youth unemployment. 
Another explanation comes under the label of 'credentialism' 
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purpose of education is that of screening, accompanied by certification, 
which identifies pre-existing differentials in abilities for erilloyers 
who would otherwise have no information about the potential productivity 
of their potential employees (see Berg 1973 and, Taubman and Wiles 1973). 
Education in effect, so the hypothesis runs, does not add to cognitive 
and affective &ills. The hypothesis suggests that rapid educational 
expansion will eventually lead only to an upgrading of hiring standards, 
and where productive capacity does not keep pace this will result in 
'educated unemployment especially for those with lesser educational 
qualifications. 
The final demographic factor, in this context, in effect forms 
the core of modern.Malaysian political and economic life. As stated 
earlier, the historical development of the country during the colonial 
era gave rise to a plural society. But, more than this, the historical 
and cultural development also gave rise to a unique situation wherein 
the regional, and rural-urban distribution of the population coincides 
with the ethnic pattern. In 1975 only 18 percent of Malaya were residing 
in urban areas compared with 51 percent of Chinese and 38 percent of 
Indians. Further, while the non-Malaya reside mainly in the more 
economically developed and industrialised states of Penang, Perak and 
Selangor (including Kuala Lumpur which now constitutes the Federal 
Territory), the Malaya are most heavily concentrated in the less 
developed, traditional agriculture states of Kelantan, Perlis and 
Trengganu. This pattern of population distribution together with 
differences in the socio-cultural heritages of the three principal 
ethnic groups spelled unequal opportunities in education, and 
subsequently in occupational and earnings attainment (see Chai 1964, 
Parkinson 1967, 1968, and Wilder 1968). 
The problems of inter-racial disparities in occupational and 
earnings attainment are well documented in the five-year development 
plans (see Malaysia 1971, 1973, 1976 and 1979). The extent of inter- 
racial disparities in occupational attainment may be seen in Table 3, 
especially in the managerial, clerical and sales categories. In 1978, 
only 0.8 percent of Malaya were employed as administrative and managerial 
workers, 6.0 percent as clerical workers, and 5.8 percent as sales 
workers. For the Chinese the corresponding figures were 2.1, 7.6 and 
18.0. At the professional level the extent of the disparities is even 
10 
Table 3 
Employment by Race and Occupation, 1978 
Source: Malaysia (1979, Table 3.4, p. 47). 
Occupational 
Category 
Malay Chinese Indian Total 
'000 % '000 % '000 % '000 ---3' 
Professional 
and Technical 116.3 5.8 '75.9 5.5 23.1 5.6 219.2 5.-7 i 
Workers 
Administrative 




119.3 6.0 105.7 7.6 29.3 7.1 255.9 6.7 
Sales Workers 113.2 5.8 249.4 18.0 30.6 7.5 394.3 10.3 
Agricultural 








154.8 7.8 116.2 8.4 39.6 9.6 313.0 8. 
Total 1993.8 100.0 1389.1 100.0 410.6 100.0 3822.9 100.0 
11 
greater, as may be seen in the list of selected professional occupations 
in Table 4. In terms of earnings, the disparities between Malay and non- 
Malay households is generally in the order of 1:2 in favour of the latter. 
The available time-series data also point towards an upward, though 
unspectacular, trend in inter-racial disparities8; see Table 5. Between 
the two principal ethnic groups the disparity ratio increased from 2.15, 
in terma of mean income, in 1957-58 to 2.49 in 1976, and 1.99 to 2.10, 
respectively, in terms of median income. 
Clearly, in an attempt to raise the quality of life of its people, 
the government cannot permit the problems of rapid population growth, 
youth unemployment, and inter-racial disparities to continue unchecked. 
It would bel in a democratic society, politically impossible to defend a 
system of declining quality of life, rising unemployment especially among 
the educated youth,, and an increase in inter-racial disparities in a 
plural society. The socio-economic consequences, including that of 
national disunity, must call forth change. And these are best seen in 
the development plans. 
III Education and Societal Restructuring 
The goals of independent Malaysia's four five-year development plans 
are more or less similar.9 At the highest level of the hierarchy, and at 
the highest level of abstraction, stands the goal of national unity. 
Although this aim is to be found in most IDC's it has special relevance 
to Malaysia for the reasons stated above. 
On the more tangible level, four principal goals may be found. 
These goals may be listed as: 
a more rapid rate of economic growth and development, 
a lower degree of economic instability, 
e) a lower level of unemployment, and 
10 
d) a more equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
While the first two goals have met with considerable success through 
a programme of economic diversification and industrialization, the latter 
two have proven more difficult to attain (see Lim 1973). 
There are two basic weaknesses in the development plans. The first 
lies in the implicit assumptions underlying the economic development 
strategies, and the second lies in the economic development goals themselves - 
which are basically by-products of the three demographic factors. 
12 
Table if 
Employment by Race in Selected Professional Occupation, 1973 
All Malaysia 




Racial Distribution (Percentage) 
Malay Chinese Indian Others 
Chemists and 
Physical Scientists 
354 11.6 76.8 11.3 0.3 
Architects and 
Town Planners 353 21.0 71.4 2.5 5.1 
Engineers 2,244 13.5 69.9 12.8 3.8 
Agronomists and other 
Life Scientists 
652 39.1 49.7 8.7 2.5 
Veterinarians 162 30.8 24.1 42.6 2.5 
Medical Doctors 1,915 7.6 495 36.7 6.2 
Dentists 379 8.4 66.8 16.1 8.7 
Accountants and 
Auditors 
1,774 17.9 70.3 11.0 0.8 
Lawyers and Jurists 809 20.3 46.8 29.9 3.0 
Higher Education 
Teachers 
1,844 37.5 34.8 16.2 11.5 
Managers 12,535 13.0 81.5 3.7 1.8 
Government 
Administrators 
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In the formulation of the economic development strategies the 
government demonstrated an overriding faith in: a) private enterprise 
as a logical concOmitant of political democracy, b) foreign capital 
investment as an essential ingredient in the process of economic growth, 
and c) fiscal propriety in terms of a strong currency and a strong 
external reserve position as a concomitant to foreign capital inflow 
(see Rudner 1975). In its formulation of the economic goals the 
government failed to consider the interrelationships between the goals 
themselves. In the Second Malaya Plan and the First Malaysia Plan the 
government adopted an ad hoc method of formulating these goals, giving 
unspecified relative importance to each. It also failed to realise 
the underlying conflicts between its implicit assumptions and its 
goals of employment creation and equity, and the potential conflict 
between maximum current growth, on the one hand, and maximum current 
employment and equity, on the other hand. 
These inconsistencies in the development strategies, and the 
historical and cultural development of the country which gave rise 
to the three pertinent demographic factors culminated, in a country 
characterised by a delicate balance between its major communities, in 
their own ugly realization. The violent racial riots of May 1969 showed 
clearly the failure of the development programme of the 1960's to meet 
the challenges of increasing unemployment and inequalities placed upon 
the society by the three demographic factors, but more importantly the 
abstract goal of national unity. 
The official diagnosis of the problem of national disunity 
emphasizes inter-racial economic disparity as the major source of 
inter-racial conflict.11 Almost as if to undo the inconsistencies and 
neglect of decades overnight the government launched its New Economic 
Policy (NEP) - the substantive content of which is embodied in the 
Second Malaysia Plan. Briefly, the NEP contains two basic policy 
goals: 
the reduction and elimination of poverty irrespective 
of race, and 
the restructuring of society so as to reduce and 
eliminate the identification of race with economic 
function (implying a reduction of inter-racial 
inequalities in occupational and earnings attainment). 
15 
The New Ecor.Imic Policy marks a new strategy a departure from 
the old system of unordered goals. Now the goals of reducing pkTerty 
and iz,,ter-racial inequalities rank foremost in the list of policy 
objectives with the latter appearing as the principal tangible objective 
and key to national unity - the ultimate abStract goal. 
The prescription itself, as contained in the NEP, ascribes to the 
structural hypothesis rather than the cultural hypothesis of inter- 
racia inequalities in occupational and earnings attainment. The 
former emphasizes differences in opportunity while the latter ascribes 
inter-racial inequalities to underlying cultural differences in values 
and abilities.12 
Given this basic prescription (adherence to the structural hypothesis) 
and the government's commitment to direct action several basic alternative 
policies are available. Amidst its fiscal, rural development, and urban 
development policies, the government also lays great emphasis on 
productivity-raising policies, in particular on education. The latter 
would, if education is an important determinant of occupational and 
earnings attainment, at least lead to a narrowing in inter-racial 
inequalities in occupational and earnings attainment - assuming that 
education is redistributed in the right direction. Productivity- 
raising policies with emphasis on education would, it is argued, create 
fewer direct conflicts than most of the other alternatives in that 
they merely strengthen the poorer group's ability to compete without 
intervening directly in the labour market (Snodgrass 1980, pp. 152-159). 
The government's commitment to this approach to societal 
restructuring lies in its belief that "... the lack of education is 
a major factor adversely affecting the ability of an individual to 
enhance the quality of his life and to advance his economic position ..." 
and that the lack of education is "... both a symptom as well as a 
significant factor contributing toward poverty." Where it is concerned, 
ft... education is a major vehicle for the achievement of the objectives 
of the New Economic Policy" (Malaysia 1975, p. 189). 
IV The Central Questions 
The three pertinent demographic factors have given rise to socio- 
economic consequences which call for change in the structure of Malaysian 
16 
society in order, not only to increase the quality of life of the 
Malaysian people but also, to reduce inter-racial inequalities in 
occupational and earnings attainment which are officially seen as the 
core of the problem of national disunity. In this societal 
restructuring process education ranks foremost among the productivity- 
raising policy variables. In line with this important role which 
has been accorded to education the three central issues or questions 
in this study are as follows: 
Is education an effective policy variable for raising 
the standard of living of those who would otherwise be 
poor? There are two sides to this question. First, 
education must be judged to be productive, i.e. it 
must add to both cognitive and affective skills. 
Education must be more than mere credentialism. 
Second, education must rank as an important variable 
vis-a-vis other socio-economic variables in the 
explanation of earnings differentials. 
If education is an effective policy variable for 
raising the standard of living of those who would 
otherwise be poor, does this imply that it will also 
be an effective policy variable for reducing inter- 
racial inequalities in earnings? The basic issue 
here is whether inter-racial inequalities in earnings 
are attributable to inter-racial differences in 
endowments or in their wage determination mechanism. 
The latter my imply the existence of wage 
discriminatio4 such that the mere equalization of 
\ 
educational opportunities would prove to be a 
frustrating means of attaining the desired objective. 
e) Is education an effective policy variable for the 
restructuring of Malaysian society in terms of the 
elimination of the identification of race with 
economic function. Here, the problem lies in the 
different impact which education may have on 
occupation and occupational mobility between the 
major ethnic groups. If the marginal impacts are 
17 
similar or larger for the disadvantaged group then 
education would clearly be an effective policy variablc, 
These are clearly very pertinent questions which demand some answers, 
and they are particularly important as Malaysia embarks on her second and 
final decade of the New Economic Policy with ever increasing resources 
being devoted to education, and without a let down in the socio- 
economic pressures exerted by the three pertinent demographic factors 
in sight in the short-run. 
V The Data Base 
In order to provide some answers to the pertinent questions raised 
and to consider the effects some demographic variables may have on 
occupation and earnings attainment, a two-part survey was conducted in 
the fall of 1978 in order to obtain up-to-date data of. the type needed. 
Details of the sampling methodology and the questionnaire are given 
in Appendix I. The characteristics of the respondents are given in 
some detail in a separate study (see Lee 1980, Chapter 3). Here, a 
statement of the educational and occupational classification schemes 
employed, the age limit set for the samples, and the bases of sample 
selection will suffice. 
The ten educational levels reflecting the Malaysian educational 
structure are defined as follows: 
No formal education 
Primary - six years of schooling 
from standard one to six. 
Lower Secondary - three years from form one 
to three at the end of 
which pupils sit for the 
Sijil Rendah Pelajaran 
(Lower Certificate of 
Education). 
Upper Secondary - two years of schooling 
from form four to five at 
the end of which pupils 
sit for the Sijil Pelajaran 
Malaysia (Malaysian 
Certificate of Education). 
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Pre-University - two years of lower and upper form 
six at the end of which pupils sit 
for the Sijil Tinggi Pelajaran 
Malaysia (Malaysian Higher School 
Certificate). 
Post-Schooling - all forms of formal education 
undertaken after formal schooling, 
leading to certificates or 
memberships in such institutions 
as Pitmans, London Chamber of 
Commerce, and the City and Guilda 
London Institute, as well as those 
from domestic institutions. 
College/Professional - Diploma and professional courses 
undertaken at commercial, 
agricultural, teacher training 
and technical institutions. 
Universiti Pertanian - Diploma and degree courses from 
and Universiti the University of AgriculLure 
Teknoloji and the University of Technology 
both of Which were elevated from 
college to university status 
following the introduction of 
the New Economic Policy. 
University - all forma of undergraduate 
courses undertaken at domestic 
and foreign universities. 
Post-Graduate - covers post-graduate diplomas, 
Masters, and doctoral degrees, 
and membership and fellowship 
of such institutions as the 
College of Surgeons. 
The above classification includes the important but often neglected area 
of post-schooling education undertaken by large numbers of school leavers, 
especially those in the urban areas. 
19 
.Ln terms t' the cccupations of the respondents these were recorded 
at the two-digit level following the International Standard Ocuupational 
Classification. In the absence of any well constructed occupational 
scale for Malaysia the Treiman Standard International Occupational 
Prestige Scale (Treiman 1977) is adopted. This scale has the advantage 
in that prestige covers more than earnings. It may of course meet with 
objections that the scale itself is of an ordinal nature. Howzver, it 
has been argued that the proper assignment of numeric values to the 
categories of an ordered metric scale will allow it to be measured as 
though it were measured at the interval level (see Abelson and Tukey 
1970, and Labovitz 1970). 
An age limit of f3rty years was set for the two samples. The 
principal reason was to ensure that there would be a sufficientiy 
large number of respondents who sat for the Malayan Secondary Schools 
Entrance Examination conducted between 1956 and 1964. The underlying 
reason for generating a sufficiently large number of MSSEE candidates 
was to obtain a measure of 'ability'. Grades obtained at the MSSEE 
form the proxy measure of endowed ability. This is the best measure 
available. The importance of standardizing for ability lies in the 
argument that those with higher endowed ability have (for any given 
amount of formal education) greater capacity to earn more, and if they 
also tend to acquire more education than the less able, the failure to 
account for these differences leads to an overestimate of the gross 
contribution of formal education and to an understatement of the 
opportunity cost of foregone earnings for those well endowed with 
ability (see Becker 1975, Gintis 1971, Hause 1972, and Griliches and 
Mason 1972). 
Three limitations in the use of this proxy variable to represent 
endowed ability should be noted. First, the examination grades in 
the main measure cognitive rather than both cognitive and affective 
Skills. Second, this is only a measure of post-schooling ability - 
with six years of primary schooling - but, in the absence of any 
measure of pre-schooling ability, this is the best available proxy. 
Third, examination grades do not necessarily measure the Skills and 
ability needed to succeed in the economic sphere. 
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Consider next the sampling methodology. In both the private and 
public sector samples, educational attainment formed the basic basis for 
the selection of the respondents. In the private sector, firms selected 
from the establishments in the Business Expectations Survey, First 
Quarter 1978 list were asked to cooperate by providing respondents in 
such proportions as to reflect the sex and racial composition of the 
firme concerned by the specified educational levels, adhering to the 
specified age limit. Due essentially to time constraint, the selected 
firms and respondents were confined to those in the Kiang valley 
region - the most economically and industrially developed part of the 
country. In the case of the public sector, a quota sampling technique 
was adopted. As far as possible the sample was selected to reflect 
the sex and racial composition of the employees in the public sector. 
Basic information on these breakdowns were obtained from the Records 
Office, Public Services Department. 
Part of the intention was to evaluate the productivity and 
marginal rates of return to various types of tertiary education which 
may provide clues on the direction for educational expansion at this 
important level. This explains the bias in the sample in favour of 
those with higher education. As it turned out, due to the small 
sample sizes, consistent results could not be obtained and, given the 
available information, it was not possible to make the analysis model 
free, i.e. free from sampling biases (see Cochran 1977, pp. 10-11).13 
For these reasons too, the results reported here are very 
tentative, and all generalizations, made as a matter of convenience, 
must be taken as being valid only for these particular samples. 
All the findings reported here, it is hoped, may be verified in the 
future in the interest of research, and the attainment of the ultimate 
Malaysian goal - national unity. 
VI Methodology 
The human capital school of thought provides a theoretical 
framework for an analysis of the central issues raised. The concept 
of human capital and the idea of human capital accumulation is by 
no means new (see Kiker 1966, and Tu 1969). Though the classicals 
and neo-classicals did not always fully endorse the concept, they 
clearly understood it. 
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The underlying philosophy in the human capital framework is that 
the capacities or Skills with which an individual earns his living are 
only partly determined by genetic inheritances; the other part comes 
from a process of acquisition from, inter ala, formal education and 
training. In other words, the individual may invest in his education 
and training not only for the sake of present enjoyment, if any, 
but more so for the sake of future pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns 
which may accrue to him. 
One principal assumption of human capital theory in the analysis 
of earnings differentials should be noted. In principle it would be 
possible to estimate the additional earnings which accrues to an 
individual for that pa :t of his additional skills which are attributed 
to his education and training by attaching a price to the relevaat 
skills. However, in practice, skills are difficult to define, let 
alone quantify. It is at this point that the theories of marginal 
productivity and perfect competition come into play. According to 
the former, perfectly competitive firms will employ any individual 
provided the real wage paid to him is less than or equal to his 
marginal productivity. By equating marginal productivity, and 
therefore wages, to skills this implies that an individual's earnings 
are determined not only by his innate abilities but also his acquired 
cognitive and affective skills, and the latter may be acquired through 
formal education and training. Given this crucial assumption of 
perfect competition, human capital theory provides a framework within 
which the relationship between earnings, occupation, and education, 




THE PRODUCTIVITY AND IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION 
The first issue to be examined here concerns the productivity 
of education in Malaysia. Unless education is productive in the economic 
sense, further investment in education may be self-defeating from the point 
of view of relieving Malaysia's population preasures and easing the 
problems associated with the need for more rapid economic growth and the 
need to curb youth unemployment. This is particularly important since 
education is a long-term investment in human capital. The need to 
examine the productivity of education also stems from the challenge to 
the value of education by proponents of the screening hypothesis or 
credentialism. A related issue concerns the importance of education in 
determining earnings vis-a-evis other socio-economic variables. For 
education to be an effective policy variable it must be judged to be 
both productive and a highly important determinant of earnings. 
The Screening Hypothesis 
From the point of view of human capital theory it does not matter 
whether education adds to cognitive an4/or affective Skills of the 
individual. The basic thesis is that it does. This asaumption has in 
recent years come under severe challenge from the proponents of the 
screening hypothesis (see Berg 1973, and Taubman and Wiles 1973). 
The most extreme version of the screening hypothesis states 
that education does not contribute to superior economic performance.1 
The only purpose of education is that of screening or filtering, 
accompanied by certification, Which identifies pre-existing 
differentials in abilities for employers who would otherwise have 
no information about the potential productivity of their employees. 
Educational certification is the means by which employers sieve out 
new employees in terms of ability, achievement motivation, and possible 
family background. In short, employers select applicants in terms 
of their trainability. 
The screening hypothesis does not necessarily imply that education 
has no value. In the case where different qualities of labour are perfect 
substitutes in production the net private value of education will be 
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positive but the social value will always be negative since education 
is never v-Uhout some cost. Society will then be better off if the 
more able would L3roe not to seek education in an attempt to signal their 
superior ability to employers. On the other hand, in a more realistic 
situation where different qualities of labour are not perfect 
substitutes in producUon (see Psacharopoulos 1973) education has a 
positive social valt: if it improves the allocation of people between 
jobs. There is -lowirer a limitt depending on the cost of education 
there may be over-investment such that no screening would be better 
for everyone than the amount provided under competitive equilibrium. 
But, even if education is free, the theory maintains that it is 
socially citims1 to restrict it so as to improve its screening function. 
The implications of the hypothesis are quite serious for those 
policy makers bent on using education as a policy variable for the 
reduction of poverty and income inequalities. Initial educational 
expansion will have a positive social value in terms of its allocative 
effect, and education can be used as a policy variable for raising the 
standard of living of those who would otherwise be poor due to their 
misallocation to jobs in which they are less productive. Beyond this, 
further indiscriminate expansion is unlikely to have much impact since 
employers will simply upgrade hiring standards. In fact the whole 
process may lead to a decline in average productivity due to 
misallocation of individuals between jobs. 
In Malaysia, Mazumdar (1975) provides some evidence in support 
of the downgrading of occupational attainment of graduates from 
secondary schools. This and his finding that dropouts earn 
significantly less than graduates at all schooling levels have been 
cited as evidence in favour of the argument that Malaysian education, 
especially at the primary and lower-secondary levels, is unproductive. 
If this is indeed the case then the provision of more education and 
the redistribution of educational opportunities in favour of the 
Malays would be self-defeating. 
II Test of the Screening Hypothesis 
As Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) have argued, no direct test 
of the validity of the screening hypothesis can be performed, and no 
simple answers can be found, in the absence of precise information on 
Earnings 
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the set of ability data available to employers, the set of data on 
ability and other attributes not affected by education, and individual 
marginal productivities. It is therefore necessary to resort to 
indirect tests by examining the validity of the predictions of the 
hypothesis. 
The test here deals not with the weak version of the hypothesis 
with which few would disagree but with the strong version of the 
hypothesis. According to the former, employers offer relatively 
higher starting wages to the more educated in the absence of any 
other information on the employee's productivity. Employers will 
continuo to pay more to the higher educated employees over time since 
education is not only a screen but it is also productive. According 
to the strong version rational employers will pay the more educated 
higher starting wages but will adjust downwards the wages of the more 
educated (but not more productive) relative to the less educated (but 
equally productive) over time. These situations may be illustrated 
by the convergence or divergence of the experience-earnings profiles 
as in Figure 1. The dotted lines show the case of the strong version 
of the screening hypothesis; the profiles tend to converge (or 
diverge less steeply) with experience since the initial hiring 






Figure 1: Screening and Experience-Earnings Profiles 
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The key to the test lies, as Psacharopoulos (1980) suggests, in 
the distinction between the competitive and the non-competitive sectors 
of the economy. Since governments are not profit maximizers and can 
produce any output of public services that Parliament approves, it is 
the obvious choice for the non-competitive component of the test. The 
private sector, on the other hand, consisting of profit (or sales or 
growth) maximizing firms which operate on an economic rationalei is 
the obvious choice for the competitive component. Wages in the private 
sector are more likely to be determined by the marginal productivity 
of labour than they are in the public sector. Private sector employers 
can be expected to conduct 'on-the-job screening', adjusting the wages 
of their employees accordingly. On the other hand, employees in the 
public sector are less likely to undergo 'on-the-job screenine; their 
wages more often than not progress along pre-determined pay scales which 
are normally directly related to paper qualifications, such as in 
Malaysia (see Cabinet Committee 1977). 
The attempt to compare wage structures in the two sectors might 
meet with an objection. In most countries, Malaysia included, anything 
from one-third to two-thirds of all highly qualified manpower is employed 
in the public sector. It might be argued that the public sector has a 
tendency to force artificially high pay scales on the private sector, 
especially in LDC's, so any comparison of wages between the two sectors 
and, more importantly, any attempt to link wages with marginal productivity 
will be tenuous since a concept such as marginal productivity lacks content 
in the public sector. If this is indeed the case, then the correlation 
between wages and education cannot be equated with the correlation between 
marginal productivity of labour and education which lies at the heart of 
the argument. 
Fortunately, this is not the entire case in Malaysia. In the last 
report on public sector salaries the government emphasizes its reluctance 
and inability to match wages in the private sector for highly qualified 
manpower (see Cabinet Committee 1977, pp. 14-15). Since the private 
sector does pay highly qualified manpower above the pay scales in the 
public sector, the marginal productivity of labour in the private sector 
remains a key element in determining actual wage structures. However, 
as Blaug (1972, p. 62) remarks, the high proportion of qualified people 
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employed by the government reduces the confidence one may havy in the 
competitive model of professional labour markets. 
III The amirical Results2 
The basic test itself lies in a comparison between two earnings 
functions, i.e. the private and public sector earnings functions. 
Assuming that the labour market is perfectly competitive so that wages 
reflect the value marginal product of labour, and that there are no 
inequalities in ability, physical skills, socio-economic background, 
and access to the capital market so that everyone has the same 
opportunities, the simple earnings function may be stated as: 
lnYs 
= lnY + rs 
, o 
. the natural logarithm 
with some schooling; 
= the natural logarithm 
with no schooling; 
s = the difference in the length of schooling between 
the two individuals; 
and r = the rate of return to schooling. 
This shows that the percentage increments in earnings are strictly 
proportional to the absolute differences in the length of schooling, with 
the rate of return to schooling as the proportionality coefficient. More 
precisely, the natural logarithm of earnings is a linear function of the 
length of formal schooling (see Mincer 1974, pp. 7-11). 
This simple schooling model does not score well with reality since 
most individuals do continue to invest in themselves after their period 
of formal education. Individuals continue to develop their skills and 
earning capacity and these are usually acquired on the job; i.e. in the 
form of general and/or specific on-the-job training (see Becker 1962). 
Then, assuming that the ratio of post-schooling investment declines 
linearly and reaches zero at some period T, i.e. K = K (1 - t/T), this 
enables one to write the basic Becker-Chiswick-Mincer earnings function 
as follows: 
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Yr = net (actual) earnings at experience t, 
Yf = gross (potential) earnings at experience t, 
kl = investment ratio during post-schooling years (<1), 
r = rate of return to schooling, 
e = rate of return to post-schooling investment, 
s = length of schooling, 
and t = years of work experience. 
This is amenable to empirical analysis using linear regression techniques 
(see Nincer 1974, Becker 1975, and Becker and Chiswick 1966).3 
Two further extensions of the basic test are made here. First is the 
introduction of interaction terms which permit more than casual observation 
of the convergence or divergence of the experience-earnings profiles.4 
Second, since the higher returns to higher education may be no more than 
a reflection of the superior ability of those with higher education - 
i.e. screening has been performed efficiently - an attempt must be made 
to control for differences in ability. 
Table 1 presents the earnings functions for the two sectors. The 
level of education is measured in terms of highest educational qualifications 
as set out in the previous chapter. Three salient features of earnings 
functions may be noted here. First, the variables used together explain 
up to four-fifths of earnings differentials in both sectors. Second, the 




Earnings Functions by Economic Sector 
aDep ndent variable is natural logarithm of monthly earnings. 
bSigr ficant at 0.01 level. 
cSignificant at 0.05 level. 
Independent Variable Private Public 
Constant 5.116 5.455 
Lower secondary 0.135b 0,202b 
(2.993) (2.845) 
Upper secondary 0.475b 0.400b 
(11.318) (4.947) 
Post-schooling 0.533b 0.378b 
(10.995) (5.297) 
Sixth form 0.7661° 0.6351') 
(14.349) (8,071) 




Post-graduate 2.006b 1.502b 
(21.351) (21.591) 
Years of experience, t 0.037c b 0.041 
(2.389) (4.285) 
t2 -0.0002 0.0004 
(0.202) (0.546) 
Years of schooling x t, St 0007b 0.002c 
(5.284) (2.517) 
St2 -0.0002b -0.0001c 
(2.756) (2.392) 
e 0.800 0.787 
N 1178 781 
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that the returns to education are generally higher in the competitive 
(private) sector than in the non-competitive (public) sector.5 This 
implies that the cowpetitive sector places a higher value on higher 
education than the non-competitive sector even after the employees have 
been subject to 'on-the-job screening'. Third, and perhaps the most 
important feature here, the coefficient of St is positive and significant 
in both sectors, but its absolute value in the competitive sector is at 
least three times that in the non-competitive sector, showing that 
though the experience-earnings profiles diverge in both sectors they 
do so much more in the sector where productivity matters. The test 
for the equality of the two sets of coefficients shows that they differ 
significantly at the 1 percent level; F-ratio = 16.694. 
It may of course be argued that screening has been performed 
efficiently so that the higher returns to higher education may be no 
more than a reflection of the superior ability of those with higher 
education. In reply to this, earnings functions are estimated for the 
two sub-samples of respondents who sat for the MSSEE.6 Ability is 
here measured by a rank ordering of MSSRE grades.? Three salient 
features of the regression equations in Table 2 may be noted. First, 
the coefficients of St are all positive - though they are smaller than 
for the complete samples due to the narrower range of work experience 
of the respondents - showing no tendency for the experience-earnings 
profiles to converge in either sector. Second, the results show that, 
even after controlling for 'ability' the rates of return to schooling 
are still higher in the competitive sector than in the non-competitive 
sector. Third, the competitive sector provides higher returns to 
'ability' - more than twice as much - than the non-competitive sector. 
Test for the equality of the two sets of coefficients again led to a 
rejection of the null-hypothesis; F-ratio = 21.482. 
What the above means is that in the case where productivity is 
likely to matter, more education continues to have a value even after 
controlling for experience, and this holds even among employees who 
have been certified to be equally able (at least in cognitive terms). 
The test here produced results which are inconsistent with the strong 
version of the screening hypothesis. The indications are that education 
is valued more highly in the competitive (private) sector than in the 
Table 2 
Earnings Functions with Ability Variable by 
Economic Sector 
aDependent variable is natural logarithm of monthly earnings 
bSignificant at the 0,01 level. 
cSignificant at the 0.05 level. 
dSignificant at the 0.10 level. 
Independent Variable Private Public Private Public 
Constant 5.226 5.513 4.982 5.552 
Lower secondary 0.232c 0.262d 0.170d 0.240d 
(2.634) (1.959) (1.951) (1.807) 
Upper secondary 0.583b 0.453b 0.483b 
. b 0.427 
(7,054) (3.408) (5.746) (3.234) 
Post-schooling 0.6221) 
b 0.307 b 0.508 b 0.38.5 
(6.341) (2.861) (5.108) (2.796) 
Sixth form 0.013b 0.575b 0.691b 0.525b 
(7.462) (3.832) (6.285) (3.510) 
College/professional 1333b 0792b 1.205b 0.774b 
(11.606) (5.727) (10.346) (5.633) 
University 
b 1.804 1.270b b 1,647 1.226b 
(14.541) (8.446) (13.033) (8.180) 
Post-graduate 
a 2.02o . 1259b 1.860b 1.219b 
(13.037) (8.194) (11.856) (7.967) 
Years of experience, t -0.021 -0.117b -0.005 -0.105 
b 
(0.468) (3.360) (0.107) (3.031) 
t2 0.004 0,009b 0.003 0.008 
(1.367) (3.911) (1.006) (3.679) 
Years of schooling x t, St 0010b 0,011b 0.008b 0.009b 
(3.069) (4.318) (2.600) (4.058) 
St2 -0.0005b -0.0006b -0.0004d -0.0000 
(2.171) (3.397) (1.786) (3.235) 
Ability 0.116b 0.051 1 
(4.513) (2.929) -4 
A2 0.760 0.719 0.769 0.724 
ANOVA F-ratio 20.369 8.578 
N 482 469 482 469 
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non-competitive (public) sector. In Malaysia, education must have an 
inherent productive value. 
There is however the problem of the lower marginal rate of return 
to lower-secondary education in the competitive sector than in the non- 
competitive sector. This is coupled with the problem of educated youth 
unemployment in the midst of substantial vacancies for blue-collar jobs. 
In the midst of educated youth unemployment, registered new vacancies 
for blue-collar jobs accounted for over three-quarters of all registered 
new vacancies at the end of 1979 (see Department of Statistics 1980, 
Table 9.15, p. 189). The problem does not appear to lie in the 
possibility that education at the lower-secondary level is unproductive 
in that it does not add to cognitive and affective skills. The problem 
appears to lie in the cultivation of attitudes and the continuance of a 
wage structure which favours white-collar employment (see for instance 
Mazumdar 1975, and Department of Statistics 1980, Tables 9.6 to 9.8, 
pp. 182-184). 
IV The Importance of Education in Earnings Differentials 
Though education may have a productive value, it must also be an 
important determinant of earnings differentials if it is to serve 
effectively as a policy variable for the reduction and elimination of 
poverty. In other words, for education as a productivity-raising device 
to be an effective policy variable in terms of the reduction, at the 
very least, of inequality in labour earnings it must rank as one of 
the more important determinants of income, vis-a-vis other socio- 
economic variables. 
In order to examine the importance of education as a determinant 
of earnings differentials, a structural form earnings function may be 
specified as follows: 
(3) lnY f(E, Q, N, M, P, B) + u 
where lnY is the natural logarithm of earnings, E is a vector of 
educational qualifications, Q is the vector of quality of education 
variables, N is a vector of employment variables, M the vector of 
demographic or motivational variables, P the vector of personal 
characteristics variables, and B the family background variables vector.8 
The final list of variables in the structural equation of the 
expanded human capital model is dhown in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3 





II Quality of Education 
Language of 
Instruction at School 
Status of School 
Location of School 
Description 
Dummy variables for highest 
educational qualification 
E1 
= 1 if Lower Certificate of 
Education or equivalent 
E2 
= 1 if Malaysian Certificate 
of Education or equivalent 
E3 = I if post-schooling 
qualification 
E4 
= I if Higher School Certificate 
or equivalent 
E5 
= I if college qualification 
E6 
= i if graduate of Universiti 
Pertanian or Universiti 
Teknoloji 
E7 
= I if graduate of other 
universities 
E8 
= i if post-graduate 
Dummy variables for medium 
Sm 
= 1 if Malay medium 
Se 
= 1 if English medium 
Dummy variables for school type 
S = 1 if fully government school 
Sa 
= 1 if government aided school 
Dummy variables 
Sc 
= 1 if located in the cities 
and municipalities of 
Kuala Lumpur, Penang, 
Petaling Jaya, Ipoh, Johor 
Balm, and Melaka Town 
St 
= 1 if located in other state 
or district capitals 
Su 
= 1 if other urban areas 
contad 
Variables 
III Employment Characteristics 
1. ForTal Training 
Job Quits 
IV Demographic or 
'Motivational' Variables 
Marital Status 







FT = 1 if the individual received 
some form of formal training 
within the firm, e.g. training 
organised wA:rin the firm, in 
specialized training 
institution, apprenticeship, 
and overseas training 
MANUF = 1 if manufacturing 
CONST = 1 if construction 
RETAIL = 1 if retail trade 
WSALE = 1 if wholesale trade 
FINAN = 1 if financial sector 
QUITS = number of employers 
excluding the present employer 
since first fulltime employment 
DImmy variable: MARRIED = 1 if 
married 
NODEP = total number of people 
dependent on the individual 
for financial support 
Dummy variable: MALE = 1 if the 
individual is of the male sex 
Dummy variables 
MALAY = 1 if Malay or other natives 
CHINESE = 1 if the individual is 
of Chinese descent 
cont'd 
Union Membership Dummy variable: UNION =I if the 
indi7idual is a union member 
Establishment Size FIRMSIZE = estimated number of 
employees within thE 
establishment 
Ownership Dummy variable: FOREIGN = 1 if 
the establishment is foreign 
owned or controlled 
Sector of Employment Dummy variables applicable to the 
private sector sample only 
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Variables Description 
VI Family Background 
Dummy variable for the highest 
educational level attended 
ME = 1 if primary education 
MEI = 1 if secondary education 
= 1 if tertiary education 
Dummy variables for occupational 
level 
MO1 
= 1 if mother is in senior 
executive, professional, 
or junior executive position 
MO2 
= 1 if in supervisory, skilled, 
clerical or sales categories 
1403 
= 1 if in service, production, 
or miscellaneous occupations 
Dummy variable for the highest 
educational level attended 
DE = 1 if primary education 
DE1 = I if secondary education 
D4 1 if tertiary education 
Dummy variable for occupational 
level 
DOI 
= 1 if senior executive, 
professional or junior 
executive 
DO2 - 1 if supervisory, skilled, 
clerical or sales worker 
DO3 
= 1 if father is a production 
or service worker 
FANSIZE = total number of children 
in the family 
Dummy variable: FIBOHILD = 1 if 
the individual is a first 
or last born child 
Dummy variables 
CE1 
= 1 if major city or 
municipality 
CE2 
= 1 if other state or district 
capital 
OE3 = 1 if other urban area 
1. Mother's Education 
2. Mother's Occupation 
3. Father's Education 
k. Father's Occupation 
5. Family Size 
6. Sibling Position 
7. Childhood Environment 
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From the estimates of the structural equation above, the relative 
importance of each of the independent variables may be compared 
standardizing the regression coefficients. The variables are staudardized 
to have unit variance (i.e. the standard deviations of the variables = 
1) in order to permit a comparison of variables which are measured on 
different units. Standardized regression coefficients, also referred to 
as beta weights, provide the only sensible way to compare the relative 
effect on the dependent variable (the natural logarithm of monthly 
earnings in this case) of each independent variable (given in Table 3 
above).9 
V The Enpirical Results 
The structural form earnings function estimated here can be thought 
of as the conditional expectation of (the log of) earnings, given the 
individual's present socio- economic condition. Table 4 presents the 
regression estimates together with a rank ordering of the variables in 
terms of their relative effect on the dependent variable as given by the 
beta weights. 
Several interesting and significant results emerge from the addition 
of the characteristics variables (apart from the dummy variables in 
educational qualifications, Eil and the actual full-time work experience 
variable, t) to the earnings function. First, the resulting F-ratios 
show significantly high overall goodness of fit in both cases, i.e. 
in the case of the private and public sectors (see Table 4). In both 
cases the independent variables account for over four-fifths of the 
variations in earnings. 
Almost all the educational qualification variables produce results 
which are significant at the 1 percent level. The apparent exception 
is the dummy variable for the Lower Certificate of Education (EI) 
showing that the rates of return to the LCE are not significantly 
different from those of a primary education in both the private and 
public sectors. 
The actual work experience variable, t, and the interaction terms 
in S (length of formal education) and t do on the whole produce the 
expected results. The important point here is the positive and 
significant regresaiOn coefficient for the interaction term St in 
36 
Table 4 
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t o.o4oa 5 0.039a 6 
(2.656) (4.245) 
t2 -0.001 o.0004 
(1.409) (0.573) 















Sector Private Public 
Regression 
Number 
4.1 Rank 4.2 Rank 
S 0.050b 27 0.064b 16 





















FT 0.082a 19 0.113a 11 
(3.692) (5.483) 
UNION -0.076a 20 n.a. 
(2.924) 
FIRMSIZE 0.0001 n.a. 
(1.364) 
FOREIGN 0.171a 9 n.a. 
(7.280) 
MANUF -0.053 n.a. 
(1,035) 
CONST -0.076 n.a. 
(1.132) 
RETAIL -0.038 n.a. 
(0.594) 
WSALE 0.147a 16 n.a. 
(2.716) 
FINAN 0.079 n.a. 
(1.393) 
QUITS -0.034a 18 -0.044a 15 
(4.003) (3.424) 




Sector Private Public 
Regression 
Number 
4,1 Rank 4,2 Rank 
NODEP 0.015a 23 0,003 
(2.879) (0.632) 
MALE 0.122a 15 0.112a 12 
(4.980) (5.628) 
MALAY 0.147a 11 0.038 
(4.092) (1.319) 






ME 0.054 0.094a 17 2 (1.362) (2.665) 
-0.134 0.221b 18 
(1.099) (2.352) 
mo 0.045 -0.037 
1 (0.577) (0.562) 
mo -0.073 -0.062 2 (1.086) (0.918) 
mo -0.101b 26 -0.025 

























Dependent variable is natural logarithm of monthly earnings. 
Figures in parentheses are t -ratios. 
n.a. = not applicable. 
significant at the 0.01 level 
significant at the 0.05 level 
significant at the 0.10 level 
both sectors. Again, this shows that the experience-earnings profiles 
tend to diverge rather than converge as might be expected under the 
strong version of the screening hypothesis. 
The set of dummy variables representing the three dimensions of 
school quality produces some interesting and significant results. In the 
case of the private sector sample they show that employees who had their 
final schooling in the Malay medium earn, on the average, 22 percent less 
than those from the Chinese medium schools. On the other hand, employees 
with English medium schooling have no significant advantage over those 
from the Chinese medium. It appears that employees with Malay medium 
schooling, independent of their educational attainment, school quality, 
experience and other characteristics, suffer a disadvantage in the labour 






4.1 Rank 4.2 Rank 
FANS= 0.0005 -0.005 
(0.135) (1.313) 
FLECHILD -0.005 -0.002 
(0.240) (0.078) 
CE 0.009 -0.056c 18 
(0.231) (1.814) 
CE -0.00002-0.00002 -0.024 
(0.001) (0.880) 
CE 0.013 -0.015 
(0,286) (0.367) 
e 0.843 0.815 
F-ratio 127.369a 85.700a 
N 1174 790 
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fart that the lingua franca of the urban and modern private sector, 
is English and Chinese. In the case of the public sector, those with 
English medium education earn, on the average, 13 percent more than 
those from other language mediums. This is not completely unexpected 
since those with English medium schooling tend, on the whole, to be 
employed at the higher levels of the job hierarchy. 
EMployees from government schools earn about 5 percent more than 
those from private schools, and about 2 percent less than those from 
government-aided (mainly missionary) schools in the case of the private 
sector sample. The corresponding percentage for the public sector, over 
and above those from private schools, are 6 and 10. These show a difference 
in the quality of these schools vis-a-vis the private schools or rather 
the superior ability of those who complete their schooling in government 
and government-aided schools. It is common knowledge that government 
and government-aided schools are generally of superior quality to the 
private schools (though some Chinese private schools are also of high 
quality), and that pupils normally seek entrance into private schools as 
a 'last resort'. 
In terms of the locational factor of the school, significant results 
arise only in the case of the privare sector sample. The coefficients are 
all positive and significant showing that those from schools in the city 
(cities and municipalities), towns (state and district capitals), and 
other urban areas earn about 11 to 14 percent more than those from rural 
schools. This can be taken as a clear reflection of the superior quality 
of urban schools over rural schools (see Ministry of Education 1974, 
PP. 32-37). 
Turning to the employment characteristics, the similarities between 
the private and public sectors lie in the returns to formal training, FT, 
and to job turnover, QUITS. In both sectors formal training has a 
positive return - in the private sector employees with formal training 
earn about 8.5 percent more than those without an equivalent training, 
and in the public sector the corresponding figure is 12.0 percent.10 
On the other hand, in both sectors, job turnover has a negative impact 
on earnings. These would suggest either discrimination against those 
with unstable work patterns or that those with unstable work patterns 
lose out in terms of seniority. In the private sector, those employed 
by foreign firms earn, on the average, 18.6 percent more than those 
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employed by domestic firms, showing that foreign firms do provide better 
wages and fringe benefits as might be expected. Employment sector dummy 
variables produce only one significant result. Employees in the wholesale 
sector earn about 15.8 percent more than those in the primary sector. 
The results seem, on the whole, to coincide with the incidence of poverty 
ac-oss employment sectors than with sectoral differences in value added 
per worker (see Lee 1980, pp. 190-191). 
In terms of the demographic factors which may also be referred to 
as proxy variables for motivation, significant results emerge only in 
the case of the private sector. Married employees earn about 12.5 percent 
more than their unmarried counterparts, and those with dependents have 
a positive marginal I-E-turn of about 1.5 percent. The insignificant 
results in the case of the public sector reflect the fact that wages 
in the public sector tend, on the whole, to follow predetermined salary 
scales. 
The results also show the significance of sex and inter-racial 
differentials in earnings. In both sectors males earn more than females - 
13.0 percent in the case of the private sector and 11.9 percent in the 
public sector. Inter-racial differentials appear only in the case of 
the private sector, with the Chinese having the greatest advantage - 
174 percent over the Indians - followed by the Malaya with a 15.8 percent 
advantage over the Indians. 
Family background variables produce few significant results which 
tend, on the whole, to be positive. In both the private and public 
sectors parental education plays significant roles in the determination 
of earnings though they differ somewhat between employees in the two 
sectors. 
The important point here concerns the relative importance of the 
explanatory variables in predicting personal earnings. As stated above, 
the relative importance of the variables may be examined by a rank ordering 
of their beta weights. These rankings are given alongside the regression 
coefficients in Table 4. As may be seen, with the exception of a lower- 
secondary educational qualification, the education variables rank among 
the top ten most important determinants of earnings differentials in 
both sectors. The full-time experience variables, in particular t and 
$t, also rank among the more important variables. Together, these show 
the importance of the two basic human capital variables - education and 
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actual full-time work experience - in the explanation of observed earnings 
differentials in both the private and public sectors. In the case of the 
latter this is to be expected given the fact that public sector earnings 
tend, on the whole, to follow predetermined salary scales which are often 
based on educational qualifications and experience (see Cabinet Committee 
1977). In the case of the private (competitive) sector this must clearly 
reflect on the inherent productive value of both education and experience. 
VI Concluding Remarks 
The empirical results presented here render support to the argument 
that Malaysian education has an inherent productive value, and that 
education is an important determinant of earnings differentials in 
Malaysian society. It appears that education can be an effective 
productivity-raising variable which may be used quite successfully in 
the battle against poverty. It should however be noted that, following 
the arguments of the screening hypothesis, indiscriminate expansion of 
educational supply is not called for. The extremely low marginal rates 
of return to lower-secondary education coupled with the problem of youth 
unemployment should be grounds for considerable concern among the 
educational authorities and the government as a whole. There is a 
need to examine attitude formation and the existing wage structure 
which discourages youths from blue-collar employment. 
CHAPTER III 
RACIAL EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS 
Inter-racial earnings differentials which are so well documented 
in the Second and Third Malaysia Plans may be attributed to inter-racial 
differentials in earnings characteristics (or endowments) and to inter- 
racial differentials in earnings determining mechanism (or earnings 
structures). From a policy viewpoint the failure to examine the underlylng 
factors contributing towards such differentials represents a serious gap 
in knowledge in the attempts to reduce inter-racial earnings inequalities. 
If differences in earnings are due mainly to differences in educational 
endowments then clearly the provision of more and better educacion to the 
disadvantaged group(s) would be a step in the right direction. This is 
particularly so if education has an inherent productive value and is an 
important determinant of earnings differentials. On the other hand, 
differences in earnings may be due to differences in earnings determining 
processes, and this would call for further research into supply and demand 
conditions, the importance of such factors as the ability to succeed in 
the economic sphere and motivation which are not adequately covered in 
this study, and any 'discriminatory' practices which may result from 
adherence to a cultural hypothesis of inter-racial earnings disparities.1 
The Analysis of Earnings Differentials 
Following the human capital framework, an individual's earnings 
may be related to past human capital investment as follows: 
(1) lnY. = b + Eb.X + u. 
3. o 
j=1 1 
Then, for any two groups, estimates of separate structural forms 
of the earnings function can be made: 
1h 
(la) lnY. = b-La 1 + EbX. + u. 
jz=1 J 
h n 
(lb) lnYh. = b." + bh.xh 
O L43. 
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where the superscripts 1 and h refer to the low-wage group (LWG) and 
high-wage group (HWG) respectively. 
Here, the question to be considered is how much of the differential 
in monthly salary, say, of the two groups is due to differences in their 
earnings related characteristics and how much to differences in their 
wage structures. The second difference can be related not only to 
discrimination, as is commonly done in the West (see Oxaca 1973, and 
Malkiel 1973), but also to differences in supply and demand conditions 
(see Lee and Lee 1981). 
To control for differences in both earnings related characteristics 
and in earnings determining processes of the two groups, standardization 
procedures are used here. The impact of these differences on the actual 
difference in earnings can be seen by comparing the adjusted ratios to 
the unadjusted ratio of LWG-ZWG earnings. 
The first standardization is in terms of earnings related 
characteristics, or endowments. This implies giving the LWG the 
endowments of the HWG but retaining the earnings structure of the LWG. 
This gives the endowment adjusted earnings differential. If the 
initial earnings functions are Yh = bhXh and Yi = 01(1, then this 
standardization is achieved by estimating Yla = biXh, and the endowments 
adjusted earnings ratio is given by Yilph. 
The second standardization is in terms of the earnings determining 
processes (coefficients). Here, the LWG retains its existing endowments 
but is given the earnings coefficients of the HWG. This gives the 
coefficients adjusted earnings differentials. Again, if the earnings 
functions of the groups are as above then this standardization is 
achieved by estimating Yi =bx,and the coefficients adjusted earnings 
ratio is given by Yi 
In fact, given equations (1a) and (1b) wage differentials between 
the groups may be decomposed as follows: 
71 bh bl tby Eb1R1 
o o 
j=1 j=1 3 
n h 
= bo bo + 







is the portion of the differential captured by the shift 
coefficient, which though typically attributed to discrimination (see 
Thurow 1969) may be attributed to differences in supply and demand 
conditions (see Lee and Lee 1981). The second term on the R.H.S. is 
the value of the advantage in endowments possessed by the RIWG as evaluated 
by the HWG's wage equation.2 The third term is the difference between 
how the high-wage equation would value the characteristics of the LWG 
and how the low-wage equation actually values them. Following Blinder 
(1973), the second term refers to differentials attributable to 
endowments, and the third term to differentials attributable to 
coefficients or hiring practices. In the Malaysian case, the shift 
coefficient itself is best referred to as a premium for score factors 
omitted from the equations (see Lee and Lee 1981). 
These measures of the differentials may be summarised as follows: 
R = raw differential 
4-1L 1.1 
= bh + Ebh211 (b + A ) Ji-0 j=1 j=1 
=E+C+ U 
E = portion of differential attributable to differing endowments 
= tbi!ah - 
a i 3 
C = portion of differential attributable to differing coefficients 
= ILTO:(b11 - 
a 
U = unexplained portion of differential 
= bh -b1 
o o 
P = portion of differential attributable to supply and demand 
conditions and omitted factors 
=c +u 
II Private Sector Inter-racial Wage Differentials 
This section breaks down the raw inter-racial differentials for males 
and females in the private sector into their component parts, using the 
procedure outlined above. The regression coefficients upon which the 
following analysis is based are provided in Appendix II. The following 
independent variables are used in the structural form of the earnings 
functions: 
Education Variables 
1. Formal Education 
Language of 
Instruction 
Status of School 
Location of School 






Sector of Employment 
Job Quits 





S = years of formal education in 




= 1 if English 
medium 
Dummy variables: 
S = 1 if government school 
Sg = 1 if government-aided a 
Dummy variable: S = 1 if located 
in the city or municipality 
t = years of actual full-time work 
experience 
Dummy variable: FI' = 1 if the 
individual received some form of 
formal training provided by the 
firm 
Dummy variable: UNION = 1 if 
union member 
Dummy variable: FORFIRM = I if 
firm is foreign owned or controlled 
FIRMSIZE = estimated number of 
employees in the firm 
Dummy variables: 
TERSECT = 1 if tertiary sector 
SECSECT = 1 if secondary sector 
QUITS = number of employers 
excluding present employer since 
first full-time employment 
Dummy variable: MARRIED = 1 if 
married 
NODEP = total number of people 
dependent upon the individual for 
financial support 








MED = number of years of formal 
education of the respondent's mother 
MOC = occupational prestige score 
of the mother's occupation based on 
the Treiman scale 
_NED = number of years of formal 
education of the respondent's 
father 
FOC = occupational prestige score 
of the father's occupation based on 
the Treiman scale 
Dummy variable: CE = 1 if the 
individual grew up In the city or 
municipality 
FANS= = total number of children 
in the family 
Dummy variable: FIBCHILD = 1 if 
individual is first or last born 
child 
The analysis here is conducted in terms of monthly salary.3 An 
obvious advantage in the choice of monthly salary as opposed to monthly 
earnings is that it is subject to fewer changes from month to month than 
the latter, which me y be affected by overtime compensation and variations 
in travel and food allowances, as well as variations in annual bonuses. 
The average monthly salary of Mhlay male employees in the private 
sector sample is $641.53 compared with Chinese male employees' average 
of $968.75 and an average of $519.22 for Indian male employees. These 
averages are somewhat higher than might be expected due to the bias in 
the sample in favour of the more highly educated employees. Here, the 
unadjusted male Malay-Chinese, Indian-Chinese, and Indian-Malay salary 
ratios are 0.633, 0.537 and 0.849, respectively.4 
The impact of differences in endowments on earnings characteristics, 
and wage structures of males from the three ethnic groups on their salary 
differentials can be examined using the regression estimates given in 
Appendix II. The endowments adjusted Malay-Chinese (MC), Indian-Chinese 
(IC), and Indian-Malay (IM) salary ratios are 0.900, 0.859, and 0.969, 
respectively. Differences in endowments among the males in the private 
sector sample do account for a substantial part of salary differentials 
between the three ethnic groups. Standardization for differences in 
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wage determining processes - coefficients - produces somewhat similar 
results; the coefficients adjusted MC, IC, and IM salary ratios are 
0.8829 0.822, and 0.9089 respectively. 
In order to determine the relative importance of differences in 
endowments and in wago structures (coefficients) on salary differentials 
the raw differentials implied by the structural equations may be decomposed 
into the portion attributable to differing coefficients. 
Table 1 shows the decomposition of the overall 69.62 percentage 
salary advantage of Chinese males over their Malay counterparts in the 
manner implied by the structural estimates. The independent variables 
account for a 79.09 percent differential in favour of the Chinese on the 
basis of the 'objective' characteristics, leaving a 9.50 percent advantage 
for the Malaya to the unexplained Shift coefficient. At this point it 
should be noted that the test of equality between the two sets of 
coefficients led to a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 percent 
level; F-ratio = 1.561. The explained 79.09 percent differential in 
favour of the Chinese can be further decomposed into the amount 
attributable to differences in,endowments and the amount attributable 
to differences in their wage determining mechanism. just over 46 percent 
of the explained differential can be attributed to the inferior endowments 
of the Malaya in the sample, leaving about 54 percent of the explained 
differential attributable to the superior coefficients in the wage 
structure of the Chinese. 
By far the largest part of the explained differential is accounted 
for by differences in educational endowments and returns to education; 
these in fact reinforce each other. Three other factors which place the 
Chinese at a distinct advantage and which are almost entirely attributable 
to their superior coefficients are their returns to employment in the 
tertiary and secondary sectors of the economy, and their returns to 
employment in foreign firms. These are not completely unexpected since 
the Chinese predominate in the modern tertiary and secondary sectors of 
the economy. 
On the whole, the decomposition of the salary differential shows that 
just over 47 percent of the raw differential in favour of the Chinese 
can be attributed to the premium as defined above by the sum of the 




Structural Analysis of Malay-Chinese Male 
Salary Differential 
Private Sector Sample 
Note: A positive value indicates advantage for Chinese males and 
a negative value indicates advantage for Malay males. 
























1.62 -0.08 1.70 
Union 
Membership 
4.19 6.85 -2.66 
Foreign 
Firm 
7.05 0.51 6.54 
Firm 
Size 
1.85 -0.60 2.45 
Tertiary 
Sector 13.51 o.o9 13.42 
Employment 
Secondary 
Sector 7.10 0.09 7.01 
Employment 
Job Quits 1.48 -0.77 2.25 








Total 69.59 P = C + U = 32.94 
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Table 2 presents the decomposition of the overall 82.09 percent 
salary differential in favour of the Chinese employees over their 
Indian counterparts in the private sector sample in the manner implied 
by the structural estimates. The independent variables account for a 
100.25 percent advantage in favour of Chinese males, leaving a 17.60 
percent advantage in favour of the Indian males to the unexplained 
shift coefficient. As in the MC male analysis just over 44 percent 
of the differential explained by the 'objective' characteristics 
variables are attributable to the superior endowments of the Chinese, 
and about 56 percent can be attributed to the superior coefficients in 
the wage structure of the Chinese. 
Again, the largest part of the explained differential is accounted 
for by differences in the educational endowments of the two groups and 
in the returns to schooling; these also reinforce each other and confer 
a distinct advantage to the Chinese. Four other factors confer a distinct 
advantage to the Chinese, and these are mainly due to their superior 
coefficients, i.e. returns to employment in the tertiary and secondary 
sectors of the economy and their superior returns to 'motivation' and 
family background. On the other hand, two factors seem to favour the 
Indians - experience and establishment size, and these are attributable 
mainly to their superior coefficients in the earnings function. 
Taking the explained and unexplained differentials into account, 
the raw differential in terms of the structural estimates amounts to 
82.65 percent, and just over 46 percent of this differential can be 
attributed to a premium in favour of the Chinese. Again, it should be 
noted that the test of the equality of the two sets of coefficients led 
to a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level; F-ratio = 
2.492. 
Structural analysis of IM male salary differential is shown in 
Table 3. The structural estimates imply a small 12.47 percent differential 
in favour of Malay male employees. As can be seen, just over 48 percent 
of the explained differential is attributable to the superior endowments 
of the Malaya, and 52 percent to their superior wage structure. Here, 
as in the previous cases, the largest portion of the explained differential 
is attributable to differences in educational endowments. Two other factors 
which confer an advantage to the Malaya and which are almost wholly 
attributable to their superior coefficients are the returns to 'motivation' 
51 
Table 2 
Structural Analysis of Indian-Chinese Male 
Salary Differential 
Private Sector Sample 
Note: A positive value indicates advantage for Chinese males and a 
negative value indicates advantage for Indian males. 












51.41 30.69 20.72 
Quality of 
Education 
-3.90 0.95 -4.85 
Experience -11.74 -1.24 -10.50 
Formal 
Training 






2.43 -2.13 4.56 
Firm 
Size 
-13.18 -0.15 -13.03 
Tertiary 
Sector 15.05 4.61 10.44 
EMployment 
Secondary 
Sector 13.33 -0.71 14.04 
Employment 
Job Quits 3.90 -0.28 4.18 
Motivation 15.73 -2.11 17.84 
Family 
Background 
16.04 3.49 12.55 




Total R 82.65 P = C + U = 38.35 
52 
Table 3 
Structural Analysis of Indian-Malay Male 
Salary Differential 
Private Sector Sample 
Note: A positive value indicates advantage for Malay males and a 
negative value indicates advantage for Indian males. 











Education 19.98 13.82 6.16 
Quality of 
Education 
-4.03 -1.47 -2.56 
Experience -13.40 -8.53 -4.87 
Formal 
Training 
0.42 0.47 -0.05 
Union 
Membership 
4.94 2.79 2.15 
Foreign 
Firm 
-4.60 --1.o6 -3.54 
Firm 
Size -15.02 0,09 -15.11 
Tertiary 
Sector 1.53 -1.46 2.99 
Deployment 
Secondary 
Sector 6.23 2.04 4.19 
Employment 
Job Quits 10.57 -0,63 11.20 
Fhnily 
Background 11.58 2.83 8.75 




Total R 12.52 p = C + U = 2.57 
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family barkground. On the other hand, Indian male employees have 
a distinct advantage in terms of experience, though this is mainly due 
to their superior endowments and establishment size, and the latter is 
attributable mainly to their superior coefficient. 
The portion of the raw differential which is attributable to the 
premium amounts to only 20 percent in this case compared with over 
45 i)ercent in the MC and IC cases. This is perhaps not surprising 
since the test of equality between the two sets of coefficients led to 
an acceptance of the null hypothesis; F-ratio = 0.953. 
Structural form earnings functions are also estimated for female 
employees in the private sector sample except for Indian female employees 
for whom there are only 26 observations. The final structural form 
earnings functions for Chinese and Malay women are given in Appendix II. 
The unadjusted female Malay-Chinese (MC) salary ratio is 0.953. 
On the basis of the estimated earnings functions the endowments adjusted 
salary ratio is 1.022, implying that if Malay women have the earnings 
characteristics of their Chinese counterparts they would in fact earn 
more than the latter. Standardization for differences in their earnings 
structures gives a coefficients adjusted salary ratio of 0.998 which 
implies that if Malay women have the same earnings function as their 
Chinese counterparts they would earn almost as much as the latter. 
Clearly, most of the differential can be attributed to differences 
in endowments; see Table 4. In order to determine the extent to which 
differences in endowments and coefficients affect the salary differential, 
and to determine the extent of wage discrimination, if any, among females 
in the private sector sample the raw differential implied by the structural 
equations are decomposed into the different portions as shown in Table 4. 
By far the largest portion of the explained differential is accounted 
for by differences in the returns to education. This, together with the 
superior educational endowments of the Chinese female employees, confer 
upon them a distinct advantage over the Malay female employees. The only 
other factor of considerable advantage to the Chinese is the returns to 
their family background. On the other hand,-Malay female employees 
experience considerable advantage in terms of the returns to their 
emlloyment in the secondary and tertiary sectors Of the economy, and to 
the quality of their schooling. 
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Table 
Structural Analysis of Malay-Chinese Female 
Salary Differential 
Private Sector Sample 
Note: A positive value indicates advantage for Chinese females and a 
negative value indicates advantage for Malay females. 












54.89 7.26 47,63 
Quality of 
Education 
-10.38 1.07 -12.05 












-2.04 -0.90 -1.14 
Tertiary 
Sector -16.61 4.68 -21.29 
EMployment 
Secondary 
Sector -26.15 -3.26 -22.89 
EMployment 
Job Quits 0.37 -0.43 0.80 








Total R 12.32 p = c + u = 2.26 
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On the whole, '9 percent of the explained differential can be 
attributable to the superior endowments of the Chinese, and 51 percent 
to their superior earnings function. The explained differential confers 
a d:stinct advantage amounting to 20.52 percent to the Chinese female 
employees, leaving a 8.20 percent advantage to the Malay female employees 
in terms of the unexplained shift coefficient. The raw differential 
reduces to 12.32 percent as implied by the structural equations, but of 
this differential only 18 percent is attributable to the Temium. This 
smell figure I, ,;erhaps not surprising since the two sets of coefficients 
do not differ significantly; F-ratio = 0.777. 
III Public S.,,ttor Inter-racial View Differentials 
Ethnic earnings functions by sex groups are also estimated for all 
groups in the public sector sample except for Indian female employees for 
whom there are only 41 cases. The final structural form of the earnings 
function is similar to that in the case of the private sector. Here 
four variables which are not applicable have been excluded from the 
final structural form. These are union membership (UNION), ownership 
(FORFIRM), establishment size (FIRMSIZE), and sector of employment 
(TERSECT and SECSECT) - all employment variables (see pp. 46-47 of this 
chapter). The regression coefficients upon which the analysis is based 
are provided in Appendix III. 
Unlike the private sector case the analysis here is in terms of 
monthly earnings.5 The preference for earnings lies in the fact that 
some employees, especially those in professional occupations, are paid 
regular incentive allowances which may form a substantial proportion of 
their total earnings. To exclude these allowances would be to under- 
estimate the actual returns to education, experience, and the other 
determinants of earnings. 
The average monthly earnings of Malay male employees in the public 
sector sample is $860.53 compared with the corresponding monthly averages 
of $1145.84 and $975.46 for their Chinese and Indian counterparts, 
respectively. Again, these averages are high due to the bias in the 
sample in favour of those with higher educational qualifications. 
Here, the unadjusted male Malay-Chinese (MC), Indian-Chinese (IC), and 
Malay-Indian (MI) earnings ratios are 0.709, 0.818, and 0.867, 
respectively.6 
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Taking into account differences in endowments and wage structures, 
the endowment adjusted male MC, IC, and MI earnings ratios are 0.940, 
0.938, and 1.077, respectively. The coefficients adjusted ratios are 
0.735, 0.868, and 0.783, respectively. These imply that earnings 
differentials between the three ethnic groups are due essentially to 
differences in their endowments or earnings characteristics rather than 
to differences in their wage structures or earnings determining processes. 
In fact, if the Malaya are given the endowments of their Indian counter- 
parts they would earn more than the Indians. On the other hand, if they 
posses the earnings determining process of their Indian counterparts 
they would earn less than if they retain their own earnings structures. 
The structural analyses of inter-racial earnings differentials 
show this to be the case, and also show that in almost all cases the 
major portion of the explained differential is due to differences in 
schooling and the returns to schooling. Tables 5, 6, and 7 show the 
structural analyses of MC, IC, and MI earnings differentials for male 
employees in the public sector sample. In the first case (MC), 
differences in educational endowments and the returns to schooling 
confer a distinct advantage upon the Chinese. But, as the analysis 
shows, only 11 percent of the raw differential can be attributed to 
the premium. This is expected since the two sets of coefficients do 
not differ significantly; F-ratio = 1.376. A somewhat similar 
situation exists in the analysis of IC earnings differential. Here, 
Indiana actually enjoy an advantage in terms of the returns to 
schooling and the quality of schooling. In fact, the explained 
differential is in favour of the Indians, and this iS due to their 
superior earnings structure. However, the large unexplained differential 
in favour of the Chinese reduces the overall raw differential to 
16.42 percent. But the main point here, as in the previous case, is 
that only about 11 percent of the raw differential is attributable to 
the premium. Again, the two sets of coefficients do not differ 
significantly; F-ratio = 1.473. In the analysis of MI earnings 
differential, differences in educational endowments, and more so in 
the returns to schooling, account for most of the explained differential 
which favour the Indians. However, the large unexplained differential 
in favour of the Malaya reduces the overall raw differential to 14 percent. 
The main difference here, from the two previous cases, lies in the fact 
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Table 5 
Structural Analysis of Malay-Chinese Male 
Earnings Differential 
Public Sector Sample 
Note: A positive value indicates advantage for Chinese males and a 
negative value advantage for Malay males. 












45.66 25.32 20.34 
Quality of 
Education 
4.88 -1.30 6.18 
Mcperience 3.29 3.58 -0.29 
Formal 
Training 
-1.96 1.43 -3.39 
Job Quits 0.47 0.09 0.38 
Motivation -2.14 1.54 -3.68 
Family 
Background 
-3.67 -0.21 -3.46 
.. 




Total R 34.33 P . C + U = 3.88 
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Table 6 
Structural Analysis of Indian...Chinese Male 
Earnings Differential 
Public Sector Sample 
Note: A positive value indicates advantage for Chinese males and a 
negative value advantage for Indian males. 













.15.54 16.94 -32.48 
Quality of 
Education 
-23.52 1.35 -24,87 
Experience -9.10 -3.34 -5.76 
Formal 
Training 
-4.81 1.26 -6.07 
Job Quits 1.17 0.03 0.87 
Motivation 8.46 0.50 7.96 
Family 
Background 
-13.67 -2.07 -11.60 




Total R 16.42 p = C + U = 1.75 
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Table 7 
Structural Analysis of Malay-Indian Male 
Earnings Differential 
Public Sector Sample 
Note: A positive value indicates advantage for Indian males and a 
negative value indicates advantage for Malay males. 












61.20 9.67 51.53 
Quality of 
Education 
27.01 11.23 15.78 
Ekperience 12.39 7.96 4.43 
Formal 
Training 
2.98 0.07 2.91 
Job Quits 0.66 0.11 0.55 
Motivation -10.60 0.51 -11.11 
Femily 
Background 
6.57 -2.27 8.84 




Total R 14.31 P = C + U = -12.97 
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that the premium is in favour of the lower income group, and if it were 
not for their superior endowments the Indians would in fact earn less 
than their Malay counterparts. The two sets of coefficients differ 
significantly; F-ratio = 1.762 which is significant at the 5 percent 
level. 
The regression estimates used in the analysis of earnings 
differentials between Malay and Chinese women in the public sector 
sample are given in Appendix III. Note that the two sets of coefficientb 
are significantly different at the 5 percent level; F-ratio = 1.663. 
The average monthly earnings of the two groups of women, Malay and 
Chinese, are $764.86 and $1014.37, respectively. Again, these figures 
are higher than can be expected due to the bias in the sample in favour 
of the more educated. The unadjusted Malay-Chinese (MC) earnings ratio 
is 0.730, compared with the endowments adjusted ratio of 0.971, and the 
coefficients adjusted ratio of 0.726, which suggest that the bulk of 
their earnings differential lies in differences in their endowments 
rather than in their wage structures though the two do differ 
significantly. 
The structural analysis of their earnings differential shown in 
Table 8 reveals the above to be the case. Here, as in the case of the 
male employees, the largest portion of the explained differential is 
attributable to differences in educational endowments and the returns 
to schooling. This is however reduced quite considerably by the 
superior returns to school quality enjoyed by Malay women in the 
public sector sample. Returns to experience favour the Chinese and 
add to their overall advantage of 35 percent. Nevertheless, only a 
small portion (less than 1 percent) of the raw differential is 
attributable to the premium. 
IV Concluding Remarks 
Perhaps the most important finding here lies in the contrast between 
the two sectors. In the private sector sample, between 20 to 47 percent 
of the raw differential in male inter-racial salary differentials, and 
about 18 percent of the raw differential in female inter-racial salary 
differential may be attributed to a premium. In contrast, in the public 
sector sample no more than 11 percent of male inter-racial earnings 
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Table 8 
Structural Analysis of Malay-Chinese Female 
Earnings Differential 
Public Sector Sample 
Note: A positive value indicates advantage for Chinese females and 
a negative value for Malay females. 
















49.53 24.17 25.36 
Quality of 
Education 
-30.54 1.89 -32.43 
Experience 16.99 4.46 12.53 
Formal 
Training 
-0.31 0.60 -0.91 
Job Quits 2.54 2.61 -0.07 
Motivation -9.25 0.44 -9.69 
Family 
Background -0.97 1.05 -2.02 




Total R 35.39 P = C + U . 0.17 
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differenials is attributable to the premium as defined Iv the sum of 
the differential attributable to coefficients and the unexplained shift 
coefficient. In fact, the portion of the raw differential in female 
earnings differentials which is attributable to this premium is less 
than 1 percent. It appears that while a substantial part of the raw 
differentials in the private sector sample may be attributed to the 
premium which reflects differing demand and supply conditions as well 
as differences in motivation and drive, the greater part of earnings 
differentials in the public sector sample arises out of differences in 
endowments. The latter is not surprising given the more rigid wage and 
employment structures in the public sector than in the private sector. 
Where the two sectors are concerned, at least one-half of inter- 
racial differentials in salary and earnings can still be attributed to 
differences in endowments. The provision of more and better education 
to the disadvantaged - the Malaya and Indians - should therefore help 
to reduce existing differentials in the longer run. However, if it is 
productive as it appears to be, and contributes significantly to 
personal income, and therefore to nationa2 income, then the provision 
of more and better education to the disadvantaged group(s) should not 
be made at the expense of the remaining group(s). 
At this point, it must be acknowledged that this method of analysing 
wage differentials does not take into consideration differences in 
occupational access - a topic left for the following chapter (but set 
Brown, Moon, and Zoloth, 1980). Nevertheless, it does highlight the 
fact that a large proportion of wage differentials may be attributed to 
differences in educational endowments. However, particularly in the 
private sector which tends to operate on a more competitive basis, 
a substantial portion of wage differentials remains to be explained by 
differences in supply and demand conditions, motivation and drive which 
are inadequately covered here, rather than to discrimination as commonly 
referred to in Western literature on the matter. Of course some portion 
of wage differentials may be discriminatory practices, but even then 
these may not be discrimination ser se as understood in the West. It 
is probable that Malaya and Indians may find themselves placed at a 
disadvantage, not because of discrimination per se but because of such 
factors as language. Becauae they are not able to communicate in the 
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same language as the Chinese who dominate the urban private sector 
they may not gain easy access to such employment opportunities. Such 
factors may be highly important, and call for further investigation of 
employment and recruitment practices in Malaysia. 
CELAPTER IV 
DETERMINANTS OF OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY 
The New Economic Policy aims not only at an equalisation of earnings 
between the three principal ethnic groups but also an equalisation of 
occupational attainment which must entail an attempt to equalise 
opportunities for occupational access and occupational mobility. In 
Malaysia, it has been argued that the labour market is segmented along 
racial lines with the Chinese occupying a dominant position in the 
private sector (see Mehmet 1972). If non-competitive recruitment 
practices abound and various institutional rigidities are common, then 
the equalisation of educational opportunities may not have the desired 
impact. In particular it may not have a significant impact on the 
restructuring of Malaysian society in such a manner that the identification 
of race with economic function will be reduced and eventually eliminated. 
The problem here is to determine the role of education and the basic 
human capital variables in the determination of occupational attainment 
and occupational mobility, giving sufficient emphasis on inter-racial 
differences.1 
I A Model of Occupational Mobility 
Following the human capital framework, access to jobs is largely 
dependent on the stock of human capital. These are usually defined to 
include formal schooling and education as well as the stock of post- 
schooling investment. The two major sources of post-schooling investment 
are formal on-the-job training and firm specific work experience, as 
well as other work experience. Human capital investment may also take 
the form of investment in information as defined in search theory 
literature to include job turnovers and changes in the sector of 
employment. Apart from these factors, differences in personal 
characteristics, motivations, family background and employment 
characteristics may also affect the occupational status and mobility 
of the individual. With these in mind the following simple recursive 
framework of occupational attainment and mobility may be specified: 
65 
= f(0 NS NS t, FOJT , FOJT 
c f' c' f' c/ p' c p 
E, Q, PI M, B, N) + 
NSc 
= 
g(NSf' 0f" tc' tp, FOJTc 
FOJT 
P9 
E, Q, P, M, B, N) + u2 
where 
0c 
= current occupation 
Of = first occupation 
NSc 
= current employment sector 
NSf = first employment sector 
tc 
= firm specific work experience 
t = previous work experience 
FOJTc 
= formal on-the-job training provided by current employer 
FOJT = formal on-the-job training provided by previous employer(s) 
E. = vector of educational qualifications 
Q = vector of school quality in terms of language, status, 
and location 
P = vector of personal characteristics such as race and sex 
M = vector of demographic or 'motivational' variables 
B = vector of family background variables 
N = vector of present employment characteristics 
u1' u2 
= disturbance terms. 
The endogenous variables in the model are Oc and NSc, and the remaining 
variables are treated as either exogenously determined -tot, FOJT , E., 
c 
P2 
Q, P, M, B, N - or as lagged endogenous variables - Of and NSf. 
To reflect the focus on occupational mobility a recursive structure 
is imposed on the model. Here, two assumptions are necessary. First, 
0c 
must be assumed to have a zero coefficient in the equation determining 
NSc. 
This implies that the choice of current employment sector influences 
the choice of current occupation but not vice versa. Secondly, to treat 
Nßc as a predetermined variable in equation (1) ill must be uncorrelated 
with u2. (1) may then be consistently estimated by OLS without 
further attention being devoted to equation (2). 
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The first assumption that the shift in sector of employment comes 
prior to shifts in occupational status is, to a large extent, arbitrary. 
However, recent discussions on internal labour markets by dual labour 
market theorists as well as non-dualists suggest that interfirm mobility- 
reflected by industry or regional mobility - does not guarantee 
simultaneous occupational mobility. It is argued that upward mobility 
comes through the accumulation of seniority (see Wachter 1974). 
The second assumption concerning the error terms breaks down if 
the disturbances capture the effects of those variables that are 
difficult to measure directly (e.g. motivation and ability) which makes 
certain individuals more likely to advance up the occupational ladder 
than others. To the extent that E(u 
u2) 
0, OLS estimates of 
equation (1) will be biased and inconsistent. 
One approach to solving the estimation problem is to obtain the 
reduced-form equation determining occupational mobility which may be 
written in simplified form as: 
Oc = bc + blOf + b2NSf + b3tc + b4tp + b5FOJTc + 




Since the right-hand side variables are assumed to be predetermined, 
unbiased estimates of the reduced-form coefficients of equation (3) can 
be obtained by OLS. However, these do not yield estimates of the 
parameters of the structural equation for occupational mobility. 
Nevertheless this equation is an interesting empirical relationship 
which draws out racial differences in the effects on occupational 
mobility of formal education, formal on-the-job training, initial 
employment sector, length of work experience, and family background. 
Coefficient estimates are emphasized in testing for racial differences 
in the effects of human capital and structural variables. 
Before turning to the empirical findings the role of O. in equation (1) 
and (3) should be discuased. O. serves to reflect the impact of the first 
full-time occupation in determining current occupation, Oc. This may be 
shown as follows by rewriting equation (3): 
0 = 
bo +)0f +tEbiAi + el 








= vector of coefficients 
L=the set of explanatory variables other than Of. 
A negative correlation between occupational change and initial 
occupational status, i.e.N.<0 in equation (4) is expected, at least in 
part, because k captures the 'regression-towards-the-mean phenomenon. 
This implies that an individual who starts off at the top of the 
occupational scale is, ceteris paribus, less likely to advance still 
further; instead he is more likely to suffer downgrading, if at all 
(Leigh 1978, p. 36) The opposite holds for those who start off at 
the bottom of the scale. ) has been interpreted in sociological 
literature as a measure of the 'openness' of the occupational structure. 
For instance, Bielby, Hauser, and Featherman (1974), using a model 
similar in structure to equation (3) interpret the size of the positive 
coefficient on O. as representing the 'stability' of a worker's 
occupational status during his career. Hence 1 - bl or 2L may be taken 
to represent occupational instability or openness of the occupational 
hierarchy. Estimates of A. therefore provide useful information relating 
to occupational mobility in terms of mobility opportunities for the 
different races. 
Finally, it must be restated that the occupational variable used 
here is based on the Treiman International Occupational Prestige Scale 
which is basically an ordinal scale (see Treiman 1977). This might be 
considered a major shortcoming but it has been argued that the proper 
assignment of numeric values to the categories of an ordered metric scale 
will allow it to be treated as though it were measured at the interval 
scale. As Labovitz argues, "Although some small error may accompany 
the treatment of ordinal variables as interval, this is offset by the 
use of more powerful, more sensitive, better developed, and more clearly 
interpretable statistics with known sampling error" (Labovitz 1970). 
Statistical purists may disagree but more and more data analysts are 
following this approach, especially when the research is exploratory 
or heuristic in nature (Nie, et. al. 1975, p. 6). 
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II Occupational Mobility in the Private Sector 
In presenting the results, two variations of equation (3) 
are examined. The first reduce-form estimates of the impact of the 
explanatory variables occupational prestige are obtained by omitting 
0f 
from the equation. These estimates can be interpreted as measuring 
the 'total' effect of the explanatory variables (without Of) on 
occupational prestige attainment. This 'total' effect naturally 
consists of the indirect effect which works via the determination of 
the initial occupation, and a direct effect which works via the 
determination of occupational mobility between the initial occupation 
and the present occupation. The second version estimates the complete 
reduced-form equation (3), and estimates of the direct effect of the 
explanatory variables on occupational change (LC) are obtained from 
equation (4). 






= 1 if Lower Certificate 
of Education 
E2 
= 1 if Malaysian Certificate 
of Education 
E3 
= 1 if Post-schooling " ' Qualification 
E = 1 if Higher School 
Certificate 
St 
= 1 if in state or district 
capital 
E5 
. i if college or professional 
qualification 
E6 
= 1 if University degree 
2. Language of 
Instruction 
Se 
= 1 if English medium 
3. Status of School S = 1 if government school 
Sa 
= 1 if government-aided 
4. Location of 
School 
Sc 













MALE = 1 if respondent is of the 
male sex 
MARRIED = 1 if respondent is married 
NODEP = number of people who are 






NS P - 1 if first employment was f
in the primary sector 
NSf = 
1 if first employment was 
in the secondary sector 
NS 
t 
- 1 if, first emploent was f ym 
in the tertiary sector 
2. Firm Specific 
Work Experience 
te 
= years of actual full-time 
work experience in the 
present firm 
3. Past :or1< Experience t = years of actual full-time 
work experience before 
joining the present firm 
4. nrm Specific FOJT= 1 if respondent was given 
Formal Training 
c 
some form of formal training 
by the present firm 
5. Past Formal Training 
FOJTp 
= 1 if respondent was given 
some form of formal training 
by past employer(s) 
6. Union Membership UNION = 1 if union member 
7. Job Quits QUITS = number of past employers 
8. Ownership FORFIRM = 1 if firm is foreign owned 
V Family Background 
1. Mother's Education MED = number of years of education 
of the respondent's mother 
2. Mother's Occupation MOC = occupational prestige score 
3. Father's Education FED = number of years of education 
4. Father's Occupation FOC = occupational prestige score 
5. Sibling FLBCHILD = 1 if respondent is a first 





FAMSIZE = number of children in the 
family 
CE1 
= 1 if city or municipality 
CE = 1 if state or district 
2 
capital 
Table 1 shows the reduced-form estimates when 
0f 
is excluded. 
The estimates are interpreted as meaning the 'total' effect of the 
explanatory variables on occupational prestige. The coefficients of 
the educational qualifications variables shown for the three ethnic 
groups - Malaya, Chinese and Indians (including 'Others') - are of the 
expected sign and relative magnitudes. Almost all the coefficients are 
significant, with the exception of the coefficient for the Lower 
Certificate of Education 
(E1) 
among the Indians, at the 5 percent level 
or better. Tests of the hypothesis of no significant difference between 
the races in the effect of education resulted in the rejection of the 
null hypothesis in the Malay-Chinese (F-ratio = 3.160) and Indian-Chinese 
(F-ratio = 1.998) cases, but not in the Malay-Indian (F-ratio = 0.935) 
case. A comparison of the coefficients produces some interesting and 
important differences which are relevant to public policy in the 
restructuring of Malaysian society. 
The structure of returns to the Chinese appears somewhat compressed 
relative to those of Malaya and Indians in that across educational 
qualifications the estimated coefficients of the former are generally 
smaller than the corresponding estimates for the Malaya and Indians. 
However, the sizeable differences in estimated intercepts place the 
Chinese (25.651 points) at an advantage over the Malaya (22.562 points), 
and the Chinese and Malaya over the Indiana (20.158). 
These racial differences in the 'total' impact of education on 
occupational prestige attainment may be illustrated more clearly by 
considering the detailed marginal impacts of successive levels of 
educational qualifications. These are displayed as step functions in 
Figure 1. By virtue of their much higher estimated intercept the Chinese 
stand in clear advantage over the Malaya and Indians at all levels up 
to the Higher School Certificate level; beyond this the Chinese stand 
between the Malaya and the Indians. Malaya generally come in between 
the Chinese and the Indians at all levels up to the HSC. At the college 
professional qualifications level their marginal returns (11.7 points) 
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Table 1 
Reduced-Form Estimates without 
0f: 




1 2 3 
Pace Malay Chinese Indian 
Constant 22.562 25.651 20.158 
w 
'1 
4.412a 3.029b 2.118 







E 12.002 13.453a 10.477a 
3 


























S -1.671 -1.045 2.293 
















0.342 0.461 -1.089 



































t2 -0.087b 0.043c 0.024 
P (2.357) (1.931) (0.762) 
FOJT 2.354a 1.099c 1.743 
c 
(2.947) (1.804) (1.419) 
FOJT -0.070 0.135 4.544 
P (0.060) (0.182) (1.258) 
1 
MALE -2.645a -0.039 1.385 
(3.179) (0.058) (0.823) 
MARRIED 0.535 2.177a 1.580 
(0.566) (3.039) (0.948) 
NODEP 0.187 0.217 0.198 
(1.118) (1.281) (0.720) 
MED -0.186 0.041 0.045 
(1.512) (0.437) (0.226) 
MOC 0.031 0.055 -0.006 
(0.379) (0.841) (0.054) 
FED 0.103 -0.028 -0.084 
(0.897) (0.335) (0.425) 
FOC 0.013 0.030 0.045 
(0.411) (1.336) (0.970) 
FLBCHILD -0.843 -0.004 0.113 
(1.064) (0.007) (0.079) 
FAMSIZE 0.110 -0.058 -0.020 
(0.821) (0.496) (0.082) 
CE1 
-0.744 -0.769 -0.889 
(0.630) (0.743) (0.441) 
CE 0.901+0.904 -1.304 0.060 
(0.887) (1.315) (0.034) 
UNION -0.357 -4.406a -0.225 
(0.391) (6.713) (0.152) 
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Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
a: significant at 0.01 level 
exceed those of the Chinese (7.5 points) and the Indians (9.7 points) 
taking them well above the non-Malaya at the tertiary level. Though the 
Indians experience rather high marginal returns at the college/professional 
and university levels (in excess of the marginal returns to the Chinese) 
they are still placed at a clear disadvantage in terms of occupational 
prestige due mainly to their much lower estimated intercept. 
The advantage which Malaya experience at the tertiary level could be 
a clear reflection of the impact of the government's policies on the 
employment of Malaya at management and professional levels in the job 
hierarchy. Given the regulations, though not strictly enforced, calling 
for proportionate representation at management levels and the very small 
proportion of Malaya (1 percent) with tertiary education it is not 
surprising to find that the total impact of tertiary education on 
occupational prestige is high among the Malaya. 
To conaider ethnic differences in the impact of educational 
qflalifications on occupational mobility and the 'openness' of the 
occupational structures equation (3) is estimated for each ethnic group. 
The estimated coefficients are given in Table 2. Again, the Chow-test 
of equality between the sets of coefficients led to a rejection of the 
null hypothesis concerning the equality of the sets of coefficients in 
the case of Malay-Chinese functions (F-ratio = 3.136) and in the Indian- 
Regression 
Number 




gulps _1.138b -0.054 -0.252 
(2.294) (0.187) (0.283) 
FORFIRM 0.312 0.346 1.875 
(0,410) (0.560) (1.548) 
-2 
R 0.761 0.743 0.720 
F 42.102 51.729 13.616 
Number of 
Cases 
































Reduced-Form Estimates with 
0f: 




1 2 3 
, 
Race Malay Chinese Indian 








E 3.351a 2.717a 0.752 1 
(2.874) (2.155) (0.390) 
E2 7.335a 6.706a 4.561b (5.718) (6.111) (2.247) 








E 17.142a 16623a 15.387a 









1.598c -0.847 4.800b 
(1.747) (0.749) (2.165) 
S -1.190 -0.878 0.674 
g (1.234) (1.079) (0.424) 
Sa 0.214 -0.998 0.902 (0.162) (1.213) (0.555) 





st -0.249 2.979a 0.038 
(0.232) (2.614) (0.019) 
NSs -1.120 0.175 -1.326 f (0.846) (0.121) (0.646) 
NSt 4 b -2.813 2.195 -0.897 






1 2 3 
Race Malay Chinese Indian 





t2 -0.014 -0.051a -0.013 c (1.111) (4.776) (0.989) 
t 1.113a -0.003 -0.259 
P (2.739) (0.011) (0.528) 
t2 -0.065b 0.039c 0.023 
P (2.028) (1.832) (0.799) 
FOJT 1.136 1.054c 1.915c c (1.636) (1.809) (1.727) 
FOJT -0.447 0.097 0.523 
P (0.442) (0.136) (0.281) 
MALE -1.353c 0.309 2.291 
(1.870) (0.477) (1.500) 
MARRIED 0.841 1.580b 1.661 
(1.035) (2.289) (1.105) 
NODEP 0.083 0.197 0.290 
(0.574) (1.217) (1.165) 
MED -0.150 0.060 -0.020 
(1.418) (0.662) (0.112) 
moc 0.024 0.023 -0.107 
(0.348) (0.364) (0.980) 
FED 0.049 -0.065 -0.039 
(0.501) (0.817) (0.222) 
FOC -0.019 0.028 0.022 
(0.700) (1.267) (0.515) 
FLBCHILD -0.964 -0.040 -0.695 
(1.415) (0.066) (0.555) 
FAMSIZE 0.193c -0.050 0.136 
(1.678) (0.445) (0.596) 
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Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
significant at 0.01 level 
significant at 0.05 level 
significant at 0.10 level 
Chinese case (F-ratio = 2.040) but not in the Malay-Indian case 
(F-ratio = 0.978). 
Consider first the 'openness' of the occupational structures. 
The negative estimates of X (=.b1 - 1) indicates that occupational 
change has the expected inverse relationship with initial occupational 
level, as given in equation (4). The more closely A is to zero the 
more perfectly Oc is predicted by Of for given values of the predetermined 
variables. The somewhat large negative value ofik. (-0.711) for the 
Chinese suggests that, ceteris paribus the occupational structure is 
more open for them than for the Malaya (-0.481) and the Indians 
(-0.570). Clearly the 'openness' of the occupational structure with 
respect to upward occupational mobility is least for the Malaya. 
To bring out clearly the racial differences in the impact of 
educational qualifications on occupational mobility the detailed marginal 
effects of sucCessive levels of educational qualifications are drawn as 
Regression 
Number 
1 2 3 
Race Malay Chinese Indian 
CE1 
-0.538 -0.867 -2.500 
(0.529) (0.876) (1.356) 
CE 0.999 -1.314 0.286 
2 
(1.139) (1.384) (0.173) 
UNION -0.408 -4.104a 0.765 
(0.518) (6.522) (0.566) 
quiTs -0.673 -0.138 0.014 
(1.572) (0.498) (0.017) 
FORFIRM -0.154 0.099 1.593 
(0.235) (0.167) (1.455) 
ff2 
0.824 0.765 0.772 
F 59.403 56.385 17.125 
Number of 
Cases 
426 581 163 
, 
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step functions in Figure 2. Here, only steps which are significant at 
the 10 percent level or better are shown. The Chinese clearly stand out 
above the Malaya and Indians. The higher estimated intercept of the 
Chinese (18.552 points) places them at an advantage over the Malaya 
(11.387) and the Indians (12.943), and their generally higher marginal 
returns to educational qualifications, in terms of occupational mobility, 
at most levels raise the advantage across educational levels. Malaya 
generally fare better than the Indians up to the Higher School Certificate 
level. The marginal returns to education, in terms of occupational 
mobility, are higher for the Malays up to the HSC level. At the ter'tiary 
level the marginal returns are higher for the Indians than for the 
Malays. 
Turning now to school quality, the most interesting result is the 
significant and positive impact which an English medium education has 
on occupational prestige and occupational mobility for the Malaya and 
Indians. In terms of the 'total' impact on occupational prestige the 
coefficients of Se are significant at the 10 percent level or better 
.for the non-Chinese but not for the Chinese (see Table 1). Having an 
English-medium education raises the occupational prestige of the Malay 
by 3 points and by 4 points for the Indian. In terms of occupational 
mobility an English-medium education raises the predicted current 
occupational prestige of the Malay by 2 points and that of the Indian 
by 5 points (see Table 2)/ assuming that all other things remain 
constant. These results are not completely unexpected since the 
lingua franca of the private sector is English and Chinese, so that 
the Chinese with English education have no advantage over their 
counterparts with Chinese-medium education. For the Malaya and Indians 
an English education is a definite advantage. 
The only other significant result in terms of school quality is 
the positive and significant coefficient for St for the Chinese. 
Having had an education in a state or district capital raises the 
predicted value of their present occupational prestige score by about 
3 points (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Several interesting and significant results also arise in the 
case of work experience and formal training. Firm specific work 
experience has a significant and positive impact on occupational prestige 



















Figure 2: Marginal Impact of Education on Occupational 







but not ..%; the Indians. Past work experience also has significant 
impact for the Chinese and Malaya, but not for the Indians. Thirs is 
also the case with formal firm specific on-the-job training. The 
'total' impact on occupational prestige score is roughly 2 points for 
the Chinese and 1 for the Malaya; for the Indians the coefficient of 
FOJTc 
is insignificant. On the other hand, in terms of occupational 
mobility there is a positive and significant impact for the Chinese 
(1 point) and the Indians (2 points) but not for the Malaya. Past 
formal on-the-job training has no significant impact in all three 
cases. 
A somewhat surprising result is the negative and significant 
coefficient for the dummy variable 'male' among the Malaya. Being a 
Malay male seems to have a negative 'total' impact on occupational 
prestige of about 3 points, and just over 1 point in terms of 
occupational mobility. This can perhaps be explained by the fact 
that Malay males tend to start off at the lower end of the occupational 
ladder than Malay females for given educational qualifications, especially 
those with primary and secondary schooling qualifications. They generally 
tend to start with blue collar jobs compared with Malay females who tend 
to start with white collar jobs, which probably offer more opportunities 
for upward occupational mobility (see Mazumdar 1975, p. 10). 
In terms of the demographic or °motivational' variables the only 
significant coefficient is that for the dummy variable 'married' for the 
Chinese in the complete reduced-form equation. Being married, for the 
Chinese, seems to raise the predicted value of their current occupational 
prestige score by 2 points. 
Family background appears to have rather insignificant impacts on 
occupational prestige score and mobility. The only significant coefficient 
is that for family size for the Malaya in the complete reduced-form 
equation (see Table 2). The positive and significant coefficient, at 
the 10 percent level, shows that family size does help, though only 
marginally, in terms of occupational mobility. This might be a reflection 
of the advantage of having a large extended family system among the Malaya 
whereby a large number of brothers and sisters provides elements of 
nepotism and job search assistance which contributes towards one's 
upward occupational mobility. 
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In terms of the employment variables, union membership has a 
negative impact on occupational prestige score and occupational mobility 
among the Chinese. On the other hand the number of job quits has a 
negative and significant impact on occupational prestige among the 
Malays (see Table 1). 
III Occupational Mobility in the Public Sector 
A similar approach to that adopted for the private sector sample 
is used here. The two variations of equation (3) are examined. The 
first concentrates on the 'total' effect of education on occupational 
prestige attainment, and the second estimates the direct effect of 
education on occupational change (LC). 
Table 3 shows the reduced-form estimates for the public sector 
when O. is excluded. As before, the estimates are interpreted as the 
'total' effect of the explanatory variables on occupational prestige 
score. The coefficients for educational qualifications shown for the 
three ethnic groups are of the expected sign and relative magnitude and 
are significant in all cases, except for the coefficient for post- 
schooling qualifications among the Indians, at the 5 percent level or 
better. The Chow-test of equality between the sets of coefficients 
led to a rejection of the null hypothesis in the Malay-Chinese 
(F-ratio = 2.219) and Indian-Chinese (F-ratio = 1.582) cases at the 
5 percent level or better, but not in the Malay-Indian case (F-ratio = 
0.676), as in the private sector sample. At this point, it is important 
to note that the sample data exclude 'subordinate office workers' and 
unskilled workers in the 'Industrial and Manual Group' and senior 
personnel in the public services.3 The results here are therefore 
applicable only to those occupations lying between these two bi-polar 
categories. The inclusion of these categories of employees can very 
well alter the results found here. 
The sizeable intercepts found here (36.550 for the Malays, 
40.319 for the Chinese, and 40.553 for the Indians) can be attributed 
to the exclusion of 'subordinate office workers' and unskilled workers 
in the 'Industrial and Manual Group' whose occupational prestige scores 
fall below 20 points, and to the fact that the omitted educational 
categories are the Lower Certificate of Education and below. The lower 
intercept for the Malays must be attributable to the fact that within 
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Table 3 
Reduced-Form Estimates without Or.







Race Malay Chinese Indian 
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(1.093) (0.714) (0.645) 
NSt 
f 
-1.113 -1.633 0.579 





1 2 3 
Race Malay Chinese Indian 
tc -0.718a -0.283 -0.795c 
(3.478) (1.348) (1.757) 
t2 
C 
0.032a 0.015 0.045b 
(3.039) (1.216) (2.007) 
t -0.294 -0.118 0.342 
P (0.495) (0.154) (1.268) 
t2 0.015 0.001 -1.819 
P (0.300) (0.019) (1.07) 
FOJTc 0.891 3.432a 0.713 (1.265) (5.311) (0.519) 
FOJT 0.978 1.311 1.473 
P (0.793) (o.8o6) (0.466) 
MALE 0.228 0.931 1.546 
(0.336) (1.489) (1.068) 
MARRIED o.848 -0.929 -0.941 
(1.067) (1.286) (0.628) 
NODEP -0.045 -0.364b -0.319 
(0.319) (2.072) (0.953) 
MED 0.286a 0.057 0.062 
(2.724) (0.625) (0.348) 
MOC o.004 0.010 0.042 
(o.o46) (0.177) (0.291) 
FED 0.026 0.050 -0.096 
(0.310) (0.670) (0.569) 
FOC 0.001 0.010 0.067 
(0.047) (0.415) (1.240) 
FLBCHILD 0.678 -0.043 1.961 
(0.982) (0.066) (1.575) 
FAMSIZE -0.047 -0.045 -0.104 
(0.410) (0.356) (0.489) 
LE1 -1.656c 1.615c -2.682 (1.694) (1.774) (1.347) 
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Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
significant at 0.01 level 
significant at 0.05 level 
significant at 0.10 level 
the occupational categories covered they tend to predominate at the lower 
occupational levels such as in the protective services as policemen and 
firemen (occupational prestige scores between 35 to 40), and in the postal 
services as mail distribution clerks (occupational prestige score of 30).4 
Although the structure of returns appears quite similar at the overall 
level there are significant differences across educational qualifications. 
These differences are shown as step functions in Figure 3; only those steps 
which are significant at the 10 percent level or better are drawn. By 
virtue of their lower estimated intercept and smaller 'total' effect at 
all levels below tertiary education the Malaya appear to stand at a 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the Chinese and Indians. Between the Chinese and 
the Indians the differences at these levels of education are rather small. 
At the college/professional level the marginal returns of the Malaya 
(11.2 points) far exceeds those of the Chinese (4.6 points) and the Indians 
(5.6 points), taking them close to the Chinese and Indians at the college/ 
professional level. However, at the University level the marginal returns 
are highest for the Indians (10.0 points) followed by the Chinese (7.7 points) 
and the Malaya (6.8 points). The higher marginal return for the Indians may 
be due to their disproportionate share in such prestigious occupations as 
medical doctors (occupational prestige score of 78), professional accountants 
Regression 
Number 
1 2 3 
Race Malay Chinese Indian 
CE 
2 
-0.536 -0.669 -0.439 
(0.705) (0.754) (0.?30) 
gnats 0.602 0.162 -1.809 
(0.878) (0.179) (0.771) 
-.-- 
112 
0.766 0.782 0.786 
F 44.027 29.742 15.004 
Number of 
Cases 





















Figure : Incremental Changes in Current Occupational 











(68), and architects and engineers (average score of 66). On the other 
hand, the lower standing among the Malays at the uniVersity level may be 
due to their disproportionate share in public service employment at the 
Division One administrative level (score of 64), and in the teachingr 
profession (occupational prestige score ranging from 57 to 64).5 
The impact of school quality and the language of instruction in 
school produce only one significant result, and this is the posi'Ave 
coefficient for the dummy variable Se (English medium schooling) for 
the Malays. The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level. 
Having an English-medium education raises the occupational prestige 
score of the Malay public employee by 2 points. 
In the case of actual full-time work experience ani formal 
training, public sector specific work experience has a significant and 
increasing impact on occupational prestige score for the Malays (the 
rate of change is -0.718 + 0.06+t which is positive after 11 years of 
public service) and the Indians (the rate of change is -0.795 + 0.090t0 
which is positive after about 9 years of public service), but not for 
the Chinese. Past work experience, i.e. experience in the private sector 
produces no significant results. On the other hand, formal training 
produces positive and significant result only for the Chinese; the 'total' 
effect is just over 3 points. Such differences between the three ethnic 
groups may arise from differences in the types of training received and 
in the jobs to which individuals are assigned after training, and might 
be worth an in-depth study. 
Among the remaining variables only three produce any significant 
results. The number of dependents appears to have a negative 'total' 
effect on occupational prestige attainment among the Chinese. The 
coefficients are also negative for the Malays and Indians but they are 
not significant. Among the family background variables, mother's 
education has a positive and significant effect for the Malays, reflecting 
perhaps the importance of parental input in the case of the Malays. 
Childhood environment - being brought up in the city or municipality - 
confers a negative advantage to the Malays but a positive advantage for 
the Chinese. 
To consider ethnic differences in the impact of educational 
qualifications on occupational mobility and the lopennese' of the 
occupational structures equation (3) is estimated for each ethnic group. 
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The estimated coefficients are given in Table 4. Again, note that 
subordinate office workers, unskilled workers in the 'Industrial and 
Manual Group', and senior Division One officers are not represented in 
the sample. The test of the equality of the three sets of coefficients 
led to a rejection of the null hypothesis only in the Malay-Chinese 
(F-ratio = 1.829) case but not in the Indian-Chinese (F-ratio = 1.417) 
and Indian-Malay (F-ratio = 9.635) cases. 
Within the occupational groups covered, the somewhat large negative 
value of)k. (-0.713) for the Chinese suggests that, ceteris paribus, the 
occupational structure is significantly more open for the Chinese then 
it is for the flalays (-0.574). The occupational structure appears to 
be least open for the Indians (-)k = -0.476). This stands in contrast 
to the private sector sample case where the occupational :.,,ructure is 
least open for the Malays. However, the estimates here include public 
sector employees with private sector experience who may have joined the 
public sector on the basis of being offered a better job than the one 
they first held in the private sector. This might account for the 
apparently large values which are comparable to those in the private 
sector sample. In order to examine the openness of the occupational 
structures within the public sector, regresion estimates of equation (3) 
are estimated for the group of public sector employees with no private 
sector experience. As can be seen from Table 5, the values of.A. are 
somewhat smaller for this group, as expected. The values ofX are -0.540 
for the Malays, -0.314 for the Chinese, and -0.360 for the Indians. 
This implies that the occupational structure is least open for the 
Malays. The Chow-test of equality between the three sets of coefficients 
again led to a rejection of the null hypothesis in the Malay-Chinese 
(F-ratio = 2.307) and Indian-Chinese (F-ratio = 1.729) cases but not in 
the Malay-Indian case (F-ratio = 0.968). 
Nevertheless, concentrating on the estimates in Table 5, racial 
differences in terms of the impact of educational qualifications on 
occupational mobility can be seen more clearly in Figure 4 where the 
marginal effects are drawn as step functions. Within the occupational 
categories covered in the sample, the Chinese stand well above the 
Malays and Indians. Their higher intercept value places them a clear 
10 points ahead of the Malays who in turn stand 5 points ahead of the 
Indians. Generally, the Chinese experience higher marginal returns to 
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Table 4 
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1 2 3 
Pace Malay Chinese Indian 
Nt 1.863 -0.248 3.781 










0.017c 0.014 0.007 
(1.815) (1.307) (0.366) 
t -0.489 0.304 _1.093 
P 
(0.959) (0.429) (0.769) 
t2 0.061 -0.008 0.283 
P 
(1.375) (0.172) (1.292) 
FOJT 0.711 3.008a -0.318 
c 
(1.173) (4.991) (0.282) 
FOJT 1.273 1.858 -2.423 
P (1.199) (1.231) (0.922) 
MALE 0.708 0.653 1.295 
(1.210) (1.125) (1.001) 
MARRIED 0.614 -0.956 -0.125 
(0.898) (1.430) (0.103) 
NODEP -0.066 -0.242 0.139 
(0.547) (1.479) (0.498) 
MED 0.274b 0.032 0.114 
(3.031) (0.379) (0.735) 
MOC 0.0002 -0.031 0.042 
(0.002) (0.593) (0.395) 
FED -0.036 0.039 -0.246c 
(0.489) (0.563) (1.773) 
FOC -0.013 0.001 0.066 
(0.550) (0.027) (1.506) 
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Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
significant at 0.01 level 
significant at 0.05 level 
significant at 0.10 level 
Regression 
Number 
1 2 3 
Race Malay Chinese Indian 
FLBCHILD 0.945 0.131 0.700 
(1.591) (0.215) (0.682) 
FAMSIZE -0.009 -0.028 -0.128 
(0.093) (0.242) (0.668) 
CE -1.112-1.112 1.058 -1.240 
(1.322) (1.247) (0.761) 
CE -0.525 -0.970 0.284 
2 
(0.803) (1.178) (0.183) 
QUITS 0.634 -0.017 -0.698 
(1.076) (0.021) (0.365) 
R2 
0.827 0.813 0.859 
F 61.881 34.721 23.529 
Number of 
Cases 
409 250 119 
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Table 5 
Reduced-Form Estimates with 
0f: 





Race Malay Chinese Indian 
Constant 10.499 20.744 10.023 







2.4031p 6.109a 6.084a 
2 (2.519) (3.633) (3.206) 
E3 1.834 6.947a 3.877c 
(1.537) (3.908) (1.822) 





E 5356a 10.691a 6.593a 
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Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
significant at 0.01 level 
significant at 0.05 level 




Pace Malay Chinese Indian 
FOJT 1.327b 3724a 1.068 
c 
(2.371) (6.581) (1.072) 
MALE 0.038 0.019 -0.010 
(0.071) (0.036) (0.010) 
MARRIED 0.492 0.030 0.948 
(0.772) (0.049) (0.787) 
NODEP 0.056 -0.2549 0.089 
(0.512) (1.758) (0.345) 
MED 0.136 0.061 -0.051 
(1.499) (0.816) (0.393) 
MOC -0.0001 0.007 0.113 
(0.002) (0.157) (1.026) 
FED -0.019 0.001 -0.131 
(0.281) (0.020) (1.046) 
FOC -0.003 0.020 0.024 
(0.119) (1.009) (0.571) 
FLBCHILD 0.459 1044c 0.280 
(0.814) (1.909) (0.320) 
FAMSIZE 0.007 -0.019 -0.224 
(0.068) (0.180) (1.321) 
CE 0.0200.020 -0.168 1.883 
(0.026) (0.217) (1.250) 
0E -0.129 -0.842 4.223c 2 
(0.200) (1.190) (2.820) 
R2 
0.884 0.851 0.900 
F 83.649 43.701 32.504 
Nunber of 
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Figure 4: Marginal Impact of Education on Occupational 
Mobility: Public Sector 






edliN-ational qualifications except at the college/professional level. 
At this level the Malays fare much better than the Chinese and Indians. 
Their marginal impact of over 6 points in terms of occupational mobility 
is nearly twice that of the Chinese, and about seven times that of the 
Indians. At the university level, the marginal impacts do not differ 
greatly. 
In terms of school quality and medium of instruction, Malays with 
English-medium education have, on the average, a small 1-point advantage 
over Malays with non-English (mainly Malay) schooling. Malays educated 
in schools located in the state or district capital also enjoy, on the 
average, a 2-point advantage in terms of occupational mobility. 
In terms of experience, Malays who first started work in the primary 
or secondary sectors rather than in the public sector experience a 4-point 
advantage in terms of occupational mobility. This is a reflection of the 
fact that Malaya who leave the primary and secondary sectors for the 
public sector tend to move into better or more prestigious occupations. 
A similar situation exists for Indians who started their first full-time 
employment in the primary sector; here the advantage is almost 9 points. 
Public sector work experience has a significant impact on occupational 
mobility only for the Malaya (the rate of change is -0.318 + 0.034tc 
which is positive after 9 years of service) but the impact is actually 
rather small. Where formal training is concerned, there is a significant 
positive impact only for the Chinese. Chinese with formal training 
provided for by the public sector enjoy, on the average, a 3-point 
advantage in terms of occupational mobility. Again, ethnic differences 
in the impact of formal training may be a reflection of the different 
types of formal training provided. 
Among the family background variables, mother's education stands out 
for the Malaya; the coefficient is positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level. Among the Indians father's education has a negative and significant 
coefficient at the 10 percent level. 
IV Concluding Remarks 
In terms of the impact of education on occupational prestige attainment 
the findings here point towards rather significant inter-racial differences. 
In the private sector sample the Chinese generally stand above the Malaya 
and Indians, but at the tertiary level the impact is highest for the Malaya. 
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Providing tertiary education can therefore be expected to raise the 
occupational attainment of the Malays but this will only benefit those 
who gain access to tertiary education. The majority will still be placed 
at a disadvantage compared to the Chinese. The principal cause here 
appears to be the substantial difference in estimated intercepts. As 
in wage differential models, this should be taken as another reflection 
of supply and demand conditions which calls for further investigation, 
taking into account an investigation of employment and recruitment 
practices. And if the Indians are indeed found to be at a greater 
disadvantage than the Malays then government action should also be taken 
on their behalf. 
There are also significant inter-racial differences in terms of 
occupational mobility in the private sector sample. The occupational 
structure for upward occupational mobility seems least open for the Malays 
and most open for the Chinese. Further, the marginal impact of education 
on occupational mobility also appears highest for the Chinese. Between 
the Malays and the Indians the marginal impact of education on occupational 
mobility is generally higher for the former, but at the tertiary level 
the marginal impacts are substantially higher for the Indians. Again, 
there are significant differences in the estimated intercepts which place 
the Chinese well above the Indians, and the Indians above the Malays, 
reflecting again probable differences in supply and demand conditions, 
motivations and drive. 
Where the public sector is concerned the major short-coming of this 
study lies in the inability to cover all categories of public sector 
employees, in particular the subordinate office workers, unskilled 
industrial and manual workers, and senior Division One officers. 
Nevertheless, the study does shed some light on differences in 
occupational attainment and mobility. 
Within the occupational categories covered, the Chinese and Indians 
stand above the Malays in terms of the impact of education on occupational 
attainment. It is likely that this has resulted from employment practices 
which favour the Malays and also from differences in racial preferences. 
For instance, at the lower levels, such as in the protective services, 
government policies favour the Malays while at the same time few non- 
Malaya are willing to join, prefering instead the white collar-jobs in 
the public service. 
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The main point to be made here is that, in spite of these differences, 
education has a significant role to play in terms of its impact on 
occupational attainment and mobility. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this report a broad definition of the term 'population studies' 
has been adopted. This goes beyond the common definitions of demography 
(see United Nations 1958, Hauser and Duncan 1959, Bogue 1969, and Hawthorn 
1970) to deal with the problem of societal restructuring. It is population 
studies to the extent that it considers the relationship between demographic 
and non-demographic variables. The line of causation runs from the former 
to the latter (see Lucas, et. al. 1980). However, it goes beyond this 
definition in that it examines one particular solution to the socio- 
economic woes experienced by Malaysia which are in no small measure 
consequences of demographic pressures in the form of a rapidly growing 
population, a typical LUC age-pyramid, and a plural society. In particular, 
the main emphasis of this study lies in education as a policy variable in 
the process of societal restructuring. 
Demographic pressures in the form of a rapidly growing, youthful, 
plural population contribute greatly towards the forces calling for changes 
which are now basic facts of the political and economic life of modern 
Malaysia. In particular these demographic pressures have contributed 
towards the employment problem1 and the problems of economic disparities 
within a plural society which must be grappled with. The latter is seen 
by the Government of Malaysia as the principal cause of national disunity. 
Indeed, the problem of national unity is the ultimate goal of all Malaysian 
development efforts. Within this context the government launched its 
New Economic Policy with the principal aim of achieving national unity 
through a reduction of the incidence of poverty irrespective of race, 
and the reduction of inter-racial disparities in occupational and earnings 
attainment. Adhering to the structural hypothesis of inter-racial disparities, 
the government has assigned an important role to education as a productivity- 
raising device. Education is seen as an important policy variable in 
societal restructuring, i.e. in achieving the two objectives of the New 
Economic Policy - the reduction of the incidence of poverty and ínter-racial 
disparities in occupational and earnings attainment.2 
In terms of the first objective, education must, as stated earlier, 
be productive in the economic sense and it must be an important determinant 
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of earnings differentials. In terms of the second there are two aspects. 
First, intc.:-racial earnings differentials must be attributed mainly to 
inter-racial differences in earnings characteristics or endowments rather 
than to differences in earnings structures or coefficients. Second, 
differences in educational endowments must be a significant factor in 
earnings differentials. In terms of inter-racial differences in occupational 
attainment, education can be an effective means of inter-racial occupational 
restructuring only if its impact on occupational attainment and mobility is 
1?rger for the disadvantaged group than for the advantaged group. 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
At the onset it must be reiterated that the findings reported here are 
more precisely valid only for the samples used, and that all generalisations 
are made only as a matter of convenience. The findings here await 
verification from better sets of national data. 
As a productivity-raising device Malaysian education has an inherent 
productive value. It is, except for lower secondary education, more highly 
valued by the competitive (private) sector than the non-competitive (public) 
sector. Education also appears to be an important determinant of earnings 
differentials not only in the public sector where wages tend to be geared 
to educational qualifications but also in the private sector. It appears 
that education can be an effective policy variable in the government's 
attempts to reduce the incidence of poverty. However, concern must be 
placed an the low returns to lower secondary education. There appears to 
be an oversupply of school leavers with the Lower Certificate of Education. 
This is not surprising given the rapid expansion of lower secondary 
education in the late 1960's following the abolition of the Malayan 
Secondary Schools Entrance Examination and the introduction of a nine-year 
universal education system in preference to the six-year system of the 
late 1950's and the early 1960's. 
As a device for the reduction of inter-racial earnings differentials 
the choice of education as a policy variable holds some degree of optimism. 
This is particularly true in the public sector where such differentials 
are accounted for principally by inter-racial differences in earnings 
characteristics. However, in the private sector there appears to be less 
room for optimism; only about one-half of inter-racial differentials can 
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be accounted for by differences in earnings characteristics covered in 
this study. There is scope for reducing inter-racial differentials through 
the redistribution of educational opportunities and the expansion of such 
opportunities, but further research is necessary to determine the 
importance of excluded, yet important, variables such as the ability 
to succeed in the economic sphere, motivation and drive. Nevertheless, 
part of the problem of inter-racial earnings differentials lies in 
differences in occupational access. 
There appear to be considerable inter-racial differences in the 
impact of education on occupational attainment and occupational mobility 
among the respondents in these samples. In the private sector the Chinese 
stand well above the Malays and Indians in terms of occupational attainment 
and the openness of their occupational structure. In the public sector, 
within the occupational categories covered, the non-Malays stand above 
the Malays in terms of the impact of education on occupational attainment. 
It is likely that this situation has arisen from employment policies which 
favour the Malays, and also from differences in racial preferences in 
employment in the public sector. Again, it must be emphasized that no 
account has been taken of differences in the ability to succeed in the 
economic sphere, nor has it been possible to account fully for motivation 
and drive. 
II Some Policy Implications 
Perhaps the simplest implication which one can draw from the 
empirical findings reported here, on the great assumption that they can 
be generalized, is that the emphasis given to education by the government 
as a policy variable in the restructuring of Malaysian society is well 
placed. The proponents of this simple policy conclusion might cite 
the not spurious correlation between education and earnings, and the 
relative importance of education in the explanation of earnings 
differentials as arguments in their favour. However, the problem is 
not so simple. 
At this point, it is important to stress that the following 
discussion does not deal with the attainment of Malaysia's ultimate 
goal of national unity. Whether this is best served through the reduction 
of poverty and inter-racial disparities, or through some other means lies 
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bejond the realm of this discussion. The central concern here is with 
the way in wuich education can be more effectively used as a policy 
variable for societal restructuring. 
In terms of poverty the empirical findings indicate that education 
can serve as an effective policy variable; again on the assumption that 
generalisations can be made. However, concern must be placed on the 
low returns to lower secondary education. Further expansion of lower 
secondary edu..ation may have only a marginal or minimal effect on the 
incidence of poverty. Here, reference is made only to the private returns 
to lower secolvinvry education. Social returns are likely to be even 
lower (see Psacharopoulos, 1973). 
The most common fallacy at this point would be to lay the blame on 
the educational authorities. The problem is not so simple. First, 
Malaysia's population is still growing rapidly. Further, with a typical 
LDC age-pyramid, additions of youth to the labour force will continue to 
remain high. To emphasize mismatches as the cause of the employment 
problem among youths is to miss the point. It appears that the existing 
wage structures enable some types of graduates to stay out of employment 
longer while at the same time discouraging blue-collar employment for 
which vacancies exist. 
The often recommended solution lies in the argument that school 
leavers lack saleable skills, that the "majority of them enter the 
labour market unprepared either functionally or psychologically for the 
world of work" (Ministry of Education, 1971 , pp. 8-9). In line with 
this the basic policy, proposals centre around the ruralization and 
vocationalization of the curricular. However, as Forster (1966) has 
argued, the vocationalization and ruralization of the school curricular 
can never be an effective method of solving the problem. Essentially, 
the problem boils down to uncertainty aboUt future demand for specific 
skills. This is not to deny the case for the 'ruralization' or 
Ivocationalization' but, rather, that it would be naive to expect 
schools to prepare pupils to take up clearly defined occupations. 
Perhaps, as Forster emphasizes, the need is for more adequate 
general education at the primary and secondary levels since a necessary 
foundation for vocational training, which is generally more efficiently 
provided on the job rather than in schools, is a good general education. 
The basic idea is to provide sound general education with, probably, 
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a bj s towards general science which will provide the basis for later 
on-the-job training or specialist training (see Forster, 1966, p. 155). 
Or, as Blaug puts it, "If, therefore, education contributes to economic 
growth it does so more by transforming the values and attitudes of students 
than by providing them with manual skills and cognitive knowledge; education 
is economically valuable not because of what students know but because of 
how they approac,i the problem of knowing" (Blaug, 1978, p. 38). 
The basic !tact remains that no one knows how to make education 
'relevant' to meet the employment problem. What is needed now is, as 
Blaug argues, a serias of controlled experiments (Blaug, 1978, p. 83). 
educational authorities might experiment with non-formal education 
i eluding education f, .-df-reliance (see for instance Simmons, 1979). 
The idea is to link the programme to local needs and to keep it responsive 
to community pressures. The emphasis lies in the development of a 
critical awareness of the causes and consequences of poverty among those 
involved through group discussions, learning the skills of organisation 
and leadership, and extending productive skills. Where the public sector 
post-school training institutions are concerned it might be better to 
gear such training to on-going public development programmes. 
In this context it is heartening to note that greater emphasis will 
in the future be placed on sound general education in Malaysian schools. 
In the last few months the government has made known its intentions to 
revert to the old system of education with emphasis on the 3R's, though 
it must be noted that the new curriculum will not be introduced until 
1983. 
Leaving aside the employment problem defined in terms of the 
creation of employment which affords a certain minimum standard of living, 
the study also indicates that the equalization of educational opportunities 
may not automatically imply inter-racial earnings equality. The basic 
problem here is that a considerable amount of the differentials can be 
attributed to differences in earnings structures, and occupational 
access. From this study it is impossible to say if discriminatory 
practices, as in Western societies, may be important factors since it 
has not been possible to account completely for differences in the ability 
to succeed in the economic sphere, motivation and drive. 
The most reasonable policy implication here is that further research 
on a national scale is needed. If it should be found that discriminatory 
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practices are important then it would be necessary to devise policies 
which are Oirected against such practices. However, this is far easier 
said than done (.see Doeringer and Piore, 1971, chapter 7). The basic 
proJlem is that recruitment, hiring, and promotion procedures are often 
made on the beis of both objective criteria, such as education, and in 
interviews where more subtle criteria such as speech and deportment are 
applied, the latter are often difficult to specify, and their informality 
permits practices of a discriminatory nature. 
In Malaysia, race is probably often used as a screening criterion 
in recruitment aid promotion. In the absence of an inexpensive way of 
uncovering the potential job performance of an applicant, race is perhaps 
the L:st alternative since it is probably the most inexpensive. Chinese 
employers who unknowingly adhere to the cultural hypothesis of inter- 
racial disparities for instance, with a customary idea of the 'lazy' 
Malay, may quite clearly 'discriminate' against a Malay job applicant 
even if he is in fact more productive than a Chinese applicant with 
similar educational qualifications and experience. So, racially 
'discriminatory' practices may be customary in nature, and their complete 
elimination will require more than mere legislation; they may require 
change in custom itself. 
In the final analysis quotas may be the best way to achieve the 
desired goals. Quotas can be viewed as an alternative to formalizing 
and validating screening procedures or specifying certain recruitment 
procedures. "Quotas have the advantage of specifying a desired set of 
results without tying the employer to a particular set of remedies which 
may be particularly inconsistent with efficient resolution of the 
problem Even where not binding, they may be an especially useful 
management instrument for convincing operating personnel of the need 
for demonstrating results as opposed to token compliance with remedial 
procedures" (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, pp. 152-153). 
However, like the employment problem, such problems are probably 
best eliminated within the context of a growing economy rather than a 
stagnant economy. In the final analysis the employment (plus poverty) 
problem and the problem of inter-racial disparities are probably best 
solved within the context of an overall employment-oriented development 
programme coupled with efforts to improve the quality of general education. 
APPENDIX I 
The basic objective of the survey was to obtain information on the 
education, earnings, occupation, employment characteristics, and family 
background of full-time employees in Peninsular Malaysia. However, due 
to financial and time constraints, the scale of the final survey and the 
approaches adopted rail short of the original aim of a national random 
survey. The practical outcome is a two-part survey of full-time employees 
in the private sector and in the public sector in the Kiang valley region 
which was conducted in the fall of 1978. 
A.1 Sampling Methodology - Private Sector 
The population that is the object of this study consisted of full- 
time employees in limited cOmpanies in Peninsular Malaysia. Although 
several listings of limited companies are available, only one was made 
available to the researcher, i.e. the Business Expectations Survey list 
of 220 limited companies for the first quarter of 1978. 
The 220 limited companies were selected from a list of 8,265 limited 
companies, out of a total of 18,526 firms listed in the 1974 Financial 
Survey of Limited Companies, plus the companies operating in the Free 
Trade Zones obtained from the 1976 Monthly Manufacturing Survey, which 
responded to the Business Expectations Survey conducted by the Department 
of Statistics. These firms were selected on the following bases. The 
distribution of the sample by economic sectors was based on the 
respective sector's share.in total gross revenue, employment, and net 
fixed assets. These variables were assigned equal weights in determining 
the distribution. The number of firms selected from each sector may be 
given by the following: 
i 
ij Aij 
S = {w [> R. 
13 
N, . A.. 
j j 13 i j /3 
V = 1 2 ... 8 I 11 
where Sj = number of firms selected from the j th. sector, 
w = a weighting factor equal to 0.333, 
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n = total sample size, 
= gross revenue of the i th. firm in the j th. sector, 
N.. = employment size of the i th. firm in the j th. sector, 
-j 
A..=net fixed assets of the i th. firm in the j th. sector. 
ij 
In the second stage, the selection of companies within each 
sector was based on revenue size with consideration being given to 
ensure a fair representation of industries in the sector. Every industry 
withij tne limits set by the sample size is represented by, at the least, 
the largest company in terms of gross revenue in that industry. 
The final distribution of companies by economic sector is given 
in Table A.1. The 220 companies in the sample contributed 45.0 percent 
of the gross revenue, 51.7 percent of the employment, and 39.0 percent 
of the net fixed assets of the corporate sector covered in the 1974 
Financial Survey of Limited Companies.1 
Table A.1 
Distribution of Sampled Companies 
by Economic Sector 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to response rates. 
a: See Department of Statistics, Business Expectations 
Survey: Peninsular Malaysia, First Quarter 1978, 






Klang Valley Region 
Total Number Responded 
Rubber 35 3 2 (66.7) 
Other Agriculture 10 0 - - 
Mining 22 4 2 (50.0) 
Manufacturing 75 45 17 (37.8) 
Construction 12 8 4 (50.0) 
Wholesale 30 25 10 (40.0) 
Retail 20 18 9 (50.0) 
Financial 16 16 8 (50.0) 
Total 220 119 52 (43.7) 
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Of the 220 companies, 119 were located and were found to be operating 
in =he Klang Valley region of the country. This region covers the principal 
centres of development in Malaysia, and includes the federal capital, 
Kuala Lumpur, the state capital of Selangor, Shah Alam, and the major 
towns of Petaling Jaya, Batu Tiga, and Klang. As an indication of the 
importance of this region it may be noted that in 1972 this region alone 
accounted for some 43 percent of the total value added of the manufacturing 
sector and employed 31 percent of the full-time industrial work force in 
Peninsular Malaysia.2 
Apart from the economic significance of the region there were two 
other reasons for confining the survey to the Klang Valley. First, the 
availability of financial resources, reliable manpower, and time proved 
inadequate for a more comprehensive coverage. Second, given that the 
private sector accounts for less than 45 percent of all diploma holders 
and about 30 percent of all degree holders in Peninsular Malaysia,3 and 
the fact that over 40 percent of all degree holders actually reside in 
the major urban centres of Selangor state (Kuala Lumpur, Petaling Jaya, 
and Kiang)4 it was decided that, in terms of the most effective use of 
time and manpower, the survey should indeed be confined to this region. 
Letters and a basic questionnaire relating to the firm and in 
particular to the nature of its workforce, together with a stamped- 
addressed envelope, were sent to each of the 119 firms. After a time 
interval of two weeks, during which private telephone calls were made 
to the personnel managers, only 11 firms had responded to the mail 
questionnaire. Out of the 11 firms only three had agreed to allow 
their employees to be interviewed. 
An alternative, more personal, approach appeared necessary and was 
taken. Appointments were made with the personnel managers, and visits 
were made to the firms including those which had indicated in the 
returned questionnaires that they were not able to cooperate, and this 
resulted in a more favourable response, 52 of the 119 firms agreed to 
cooperate providing a response rate of 43.7 percent (see Table A.1). 
From conversations with the personnel managers it was learnt that 
generally the firms did not reply to the mail-questionnaire because the 
information sought was either not readily available or in some cases 
confidential. For instance, records on personnel by sex, race, educational 
level and occupation were not readily available in aggregate form, and 
106 
could only be obtained at much cost to the firm in terms of time and 
personnel. On the other hand, information on fixed assets and changes 
in profits or growth rates, and information on the extent of foreign 
ownership were considered confidential in some cases. 
With the 52 companies which agreed to cooperate, the next stage 
involved the selection and interviewing of their employees. Given that 
the sampling at the first stage was not random it was decided that at 
the second stagP a quota sampling approach would suffice. 
Given the financial resources that were available and-the limited 
time within which the survey had to be conducted it was decided that 
the sample size for the private sector should be kept to 1200. A simple 
random sample at th-L3 stage would undoubtly produce proportionately more 
respondents with lower educational qualifications than those with 
higher, especially tertiary, qualifications. It was decided that the 
sampling fraction by educational level should be varied so as to generate 
more respondents with higher educational qualifications. There were 
two basic reasons for this decision. First, the emphasis of this study 
would preferably be on tertiary education which is currently undergoing 
very rapid expansion. Second, it pays to over sample the more variable 
strata; earnings are likely to be more variable for those with higher 
education than for those with lower education. 
After further discussions with the personnel managers and officers 
of some of the firm which agreed to cooperate it was decided that the 
following sampling fractions would be acceptable: 
Educational Non-Manufacturing Manufacturing 










Lower Certificate 1/10 1/20 
of Education 
Primary 1/10 1/20 







The final Fpportionments were to some extent determined by the degree 
of cooperation of the firms concerned, and there is no way of determining 
if the firms actually provided the numbers expected from them. 
The interviews for this survey of the private sector were all 
conducted at the places of work by un'versity students, most of whom 
have had some previous interviewing ex erience. They were nevertheless 
given some training for this particular survey to ensure that they would 
know exactly the purpose and nature of the study, and the sort of questions 
and answers sought for. They were instructed to interview physically fit 
men and women below the age of forty. The personnel managers were asked 
to provide respondents so as to reflect the racial and sex compositions 
of their respective f iis at each educational level. 
At this point, several limitations of the survey should be noted. 
Arising from the need to use the Business Expectations Survey list of 
companies, reducing this to those operating in the Kiang Valley region, 
and further reducing the list to those companies which were willing to 
cooperate in the study, biases may be expected and generalisations to 
cover the country or even the Klang Valley region can only be made with 
extreme caution. The sample should be considered as a non-probability 
sample. No weights are then applied in the analyses since the data are 
not amenable to the development of a sampling theory that is model 
free.5 Nevertheless, since the government considers these to be among 
the leading firms in the country, at least in terms of its Business 
Expectations Survey, these firms may in a sense be considered as trend 
setters. Important lessons could therefore be learnt from these firms. 
Biases will also arise from the fact that those selected for the 
interviews may be those who are most readily available and they may 
differ systematically from those who are harder to locate. This is 
most obvious in the case of the manufacturing firms where on-line 
process workers were difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, where provided, 
they were interviewed after their work hours. Top management personnel 
were more difficult to locate but then they are likely to be in the 
older age categories. 
The fact that the interviews were conducted in the places of work 
may also lead to some response biases since the employees may not give 
frank answers to the questions asked. However, interviewers were instrectel 
to interview in privacy and to emphasize thP confidential nature of the 
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survey. On the whole they reported that they did not detect any lack of 
cooperation on the part of the'respondents. 
Other response biases may also arise from the administering of the 
questioires, but these should have been kept to a minimum. The 
iterviewers, as stated earlier, consisted mainly of those with 
interviewing experience and they were also chosen on the grounds that 
the: v,Ire fluent in at least two languages. 
A.2 Sampling Methodolo - Public Sector 
The popul'Atiol for this survey consists of all public sector 
emp:oyees or, mofe specifically, all Federal Government employees. The 
latest listing cL all such employees comes from the second part of the 
1973 Manpower Survey. The list covers all public sector employees except 
the categories of 'subordinate office workers (Division 4 3taff)', 
'unskilled labourers (in the Industrial and Manual Group)', and Armed 
Forces personnel. Of the total of 435,166 (excluding Armed Forces 
personnel) some 300,417 public sector employees were included in the 
listing and of these 207,034 were Federal Government employees. 
The survey was designed essentially to obtain information for the 
planning of human resources (manpower projections) for the Third Malayaia 
Plan, 1976-80, and the Outline of Perspective Plan, 1970-90. But the 
survey also yielded much information that would be useful for an analysis 
of the importance of education and the returns to education in the public 
sector. The Records Office, Public Services Department, indicated their 
willingness to assist where they could. Unfortunately the Office could 
not release the complete listing nor the detailed breakdown in the manner 
desired due to shortages of staff and expertise within the Office. 
Nevertheless the Office made available three tables which it had in 
readily accessible form (computer printouts). These tables provide 
cross-tabulations of the following types: 
Occupation by Sex, 
Occupation by Race, and 
Occupation by Educational Attainment. 
These tables covered all Federal Government employees except those 
categories stated earlier. The occupational classification was based on 
the 2-digit occupational classification given in the Dictionary of 
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Occupational Classification, Malaysia 1969. The educational categories 
were rather broad - those with the Higher School Certificate and below, 
those With vocational and technical education, and those with professional 
and university education. 
Given the resources available, especially in terms of time and 
manpower, it was decided that a quota sampling approach would be most 
appropriate and that the,sample size shouldlbe limited to 800. The 
sample would then be arportioned between the three educational levels 
defined in the tables provided in the following manner: 
300 professional and university, 
200 vocational and technical, and 
300 others. 
The sample size for each category of educational qualification was 
apportioned proportionately between the occupational categories. An 
attempt was made to reflect the racial and sex composition of each 
occupational category. At the upper two levels of educational 
qualifications the apportionment was also made proportionately between 
the different fields of specialisation: arts, social sciences, pure 
science, applied science, medical science, agricultural science, 
commerce, and home science. The actual quotas for each occupation 
by educational level, race and sex may be given as follows: 
Step A: Splitting the sample by educational level: 
e.. 
e ij 




where n.. := number of respondents in the i th. occupation with the 
j th. level of education. 
e1 
.. = number of employees in the i th. occupation with the 
j th. level of education, 
N. . sample size for the j th. level of education. 
Step B: Splitting the sample between racial groups: 
rik e 





= nuber of respondents in the i th. occupation of 
the k th. ethnic group, 
rik = number of employees in the i th. occupation of the 
k th. ethnic group. 
Step C: Splitting the sample between sex groups: 
s. 
s im c- e 
n. - /_ n. . 
lm Es. . 13 
m. 3. 3 i 
where n. = number of respondents in the i th. occupation of 
im 
che m th. sex group, 
sim 
=. number of employees in the i th. occupation of 
the m th. sex group. 
As in the private sector survey, the interviewers for this survey 
were all either university students or college and university graduates 
who were still unemployed at the time of the survey. The latter were 
given the training which the former had undergone earlier. The 
interviewers were now given the exact quotas of interviews in terms of 
occupation, race, sex, and education including the field of specialisation 
where relevant. The interviewers were also instructed to interview only 
men and women below the age of forty with emphasis being given to those 
in their earlier years. 
All interviews were conducted in the places of work, and for this 
reason the cooperation of the Heads of Departments proved vital. In 
general the response was good perhaps even better than in the case of the 
private sector. In general the Public Services Department provided the 
necessary information relating to the most probable places where the 
respondents of each particular occupation may be found and interviewed. 
In almost all cases the information provided proved very helpful. 
At any rate, the interviews were conducted in the same region as 
the private sector survey. This is in fact the best place since 
Kuala Lumpur is the capital city and the seat of government. Besides, 
there are no regional differences in public sector earnings between 
regions except for those who are posted to the East Malaysian states of 
Sabah and Sarawak and for those from Sabah and Sarawak who are posted to 
Peninsular Malaysia.6 
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The limitations in this study are somewhat similar to those in 
the private sector survey. It is again difficult to generalise because 
of the nature of the sampling conducted. The inability to obtain a 
detailed breakdown of federal employees by occupation, education, race 
and sex proved to be a major limitation of the exercise. Further, in a 
few instances respondents could not be found; this was particularly true 
of the category 'agricultural, animal husbandry, and forestry workers' 
(Malaysian Occupational Classification Codes 60, 62 and 63). There 
was at least one case in which no respondent could be found who would 
fall within ti,e age limit set, i.e. in the case of 'government 
executive officials' (MOC Code 31). Finally, given the time and 
manpower constraints on hand some occupational groups were lees well 
covered than others; this was particularly true in the case of male 
teachers (MOC Code 13). Biases may also arise from the fact that those 
interviewed may be those who were more responsive or more cooperative. 
A.3 Concluding Remarks 
Given the limitations faced in conducting the surveys biases may 
be expected in the findings from this study. The study might best be 
considered as an exploratory study. It has serious limitations arising 
from the sampling methodologies adopted. Nevertheless, it is hoped 
that the findings of this study will provide important insights into 
the actual significance of education as a policy variable for the 
attainment of Malaysia's New Economic Policy goals. 
i. Card Nueer 
Respcnde.it ilumber 
Respondent Card Number 
Establishment Number 
(Private Sector Only) 
PART I: PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Sex: Female(1) Male(2) 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction: This survey has been designed to obtain information 
which will be used to study the effects of education and other socio. 
economic factors on a person's earnings and occupation. You can help 
us greatly if you will answer the questions below. The information you 
give will be kept strictly confidential. 
Race: Malay(1) Chinese(2) Indian(3) 
Other(4) 
When were you born (year)? 
Where were you living up to age six? 
Gazetted City or Municipality(1) 
State Capital or District Capital(2) 
Other Urban Area(3) 
Rural Area(4) 
What is your nationality? 
Malaysian(1) 
Singaporean(2) 
Other - Specify: 
Are you the only child in the family? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
[IF 
'no' Go To question 7 ) 
IF 'yes' Go To question 11 
How many brothers do you have? 













IF Respondent is '-,'EMALE: What is your birth 
position among your 
sisters? 
IF Respondent is MALE: What is your birth 
position among your 
brothers? 
What is your birth position among your brothers 
and sisters: 
ghat is your present marital status? 
Single(1) Married(2) Other(3) 
'married' Go To Question 12 
IF 'single' or 'other' Go To Question 16 
Is your spouse working? No(1) Yes(2) 
IF 'no' Go To Question 16 ] 
IF 'yes' Go To Question 13 
Does your spouse work in the private sector 
or in the public sector? 
Private(1) Public(2;, 
What is the present occupation of your 
spouse? 
When were you married (year)? 
How many dependents do you have? 
PART II: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINYENT 
PART IIA: Kindergarten 
Did you attend kindergarten? No(1) Yes(2) 
[IF 'no' Go To Part I* 
What type of kindergarten was it? 
Private(1) Missionary(2) Other(3) 
What was the language of instruction? 
Malay(1) English(2) Chinese(3) 
Other(4) 
Where did you go to attf-nd kindergarten? 
Gazetted City or Municipality(1) 
State or District Capital(2) 
















How long did you spend in kindergarten 
(months)? 
P,.2T IIB: Primary School 
Did you attend primary school? No(1) Yes(2) 
[rF 'no' Go To Part III] 
What type of school was it? 
50varnment(1) Government Assisted(2) 
Private(3) Other(4) 
What was the main language of instruction? 
Malay(1) En71:Hh(2) Chinese(3) 
Other(4) 
Where was your school located? 
Gazetted City or Municipality(1) 
State or District Capital(2) 
Other Urban Area(3) 
Rural Area(4) 
In what year did you start primary schooling? 
When did you stop primary schooling? 
Did you complete primary schooling? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
[IF 'no' Go To Question 151 
Did you sit for the Malayan Secondary Schools 
Entrance Examination (conducted between 1956 
and 1964, inclusive)? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
1E7 'no' Go To Part IIC) 
What grade did you obtain? 
Grade A(1) Grade B(2) Grade 0(3) 
Failed(4) 
Go To Part IIC 
What was the highest standard you attended? 
PART IIC: Secondary School 
Did you undertake secondary schooling? 
No(1) Yes(2) 







/. What was the highest level of secondary 




13. What type of lower secondary school was it? 
Government(1) Government Assisted(2) 
Private(3) Other(4) 
What was the main language of instruction? 
Malay(1) English(2) Chinese(3) 
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Other(4) 
Where was your school located? 
Gazetted City or Municipality(1) 
State or District Capital(2) 
Other Urban Area(3) 
Rural Area(4) 
In what year did you start lower secondary 
schooling? 6162 
Did you attend remove class? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
When did you stop lower secondary schooling? 
What vms the highest form you attended? 
Which examination did you attempt? 
None(1) L.C.E.(2) S.R.P.(3) 
Other(4) 
What grade did you obtain? 
Grade 1(1) Grade 2(2) Grade 3(3) 
Failed(4) 
Did you undertake any form of upper secondary 
schooling? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
IF 'no' Go To Part In] 
What type of upper secondary school was it? 
Government(1) Government Assisted(2) 
Private(3) Other(4) 
What was the main language of instruction? 








30. What educational stream were you in? 
Arts(1) Science(2) Vocational(3) 
72 
Technical(4) 
31. Where was your school located? 
Gazetted City or Municipality(1) 73 
State or District Capital(2) 
Other Urban Area(3) 
Rural Area(4) 
32. In what year did you start upper secondary 
schooling? 77475 
33. When did yot, stop upper secondary schooling? 
34. Did you attempt Lie final fifth form 
examination? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
CIF 'no' Go To Part IID) 
35. Which examination did you attempt? 
M.C.E.(1) S.P.M.(2) M.C.V.E.(3) 
Other(4) 
36. What grade did you obtain? 




Respondent Card Number 
37. Did you attempt any form of pre-university 
education? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
[UP 'no' Go To Part IID] 
38. What type of pre-university school was it? 
Government(1) Government Assisted(2) 
Private(3) Other(4) 
39. What was the main language of instruction? 










What educational stream were you in? 
Arts(1) Science(2) Technical(3) 
Where was your school located? 
Gazetted City or Municipality(1) 
State or District Capital(2) 
Other Urban Area(3) 
Rural Area(4) 
In what year did you start pre-university 
education' -17-17 
When did you stop pre-university education? 
44 Did you attempt the final examination? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
19 
[IF 'no' Go To Part 1161 
Which examination did you attempt? 
H.S.C.(1) S.T.P.(2) Other(3) 
20 
What grade did you obtain? 
Full Certificate(1) Statement(2) 
21 
Failed(3) 
PART IID: Post-Schooling Education 
Did you undertake any form of post-schooling 
education? 22 
No(1) Yes(2) 
[LF 'no' Go To Part III] 
What type of post-schooling education did 
you undertake? 23 
Commercial(1) Agricultural(2) 
Technical(3) Teacher Training(4) 
University(5) Other: (6) 
[LE 'university' Go To Question 61] 
What was the minimum entrance requirement? 
Primary education(1) 
L.C.E. or equivalent(2) 
M.C.E. or equivalent(3) 
H.S.C. or equivalent(4) 
Other: (5) 




Was it a private or public institution? 
Government(1) Private(2) 
Correspondence(3) 
What was the main language of instruction? 
Malay(1) English(2) Other(3) 
In what year did you start your course? 
Was it on a full-time or part-time basis? 
Part-t.imt;(1) Full-time(2) 
What was the ,Iormal duration of the course 
(months)? 
Where did you go for the course? 
Gazetted City or Municipality(1) 
State or District Capital(2) 
Other Urban Area(3) 
Rural Area(4) 
Overseas(5) 










Did you complete the course? 
No(1) Continuing(2) Yes(3) 
[IF 'continuing/ Go To Part III] 
When did you stop the course? 
IF respondent has completed 
course Go To Question 59 
IF respondent has not completed 
course Go To Question 60 
What grade did you obtain? 
Credit rating(1) 
Pass rating(2) 










What was the main language of instruction? 
Malay(1) English(2) Other(3) 
In what year did you start your course? 
Was it on a full-time or part-time basis? 
Part-time(1) Full-time(2) 
What was the normal duration of the course 
(years)? 
When did you stop the course? 
Did you attempt the final examination? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
LrF 'no' Go To Part III) 
What grade or class of honours did you 
obtain? 
First(1) Second Upper(2) 
Second Lower(3) Third(4) 
Pass Degree(5) Failed(6) 
Did you undertake any form of post-graduate 
No(1) Yes(2) 





Did you attend university? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
CEF 'no' Go To Part III] 




New Zealand(5) Canada(6) 
U.S.A.(?) Other: (8) 
Which university did you attend? 




What was your main field of study? 
Arte(i) Social Science(2) 
Pure Science(3) Applied Science(4) 
Medical Science(5) Agricultural Science(6) 
Commerce(?) Home Science(8) 
What type of post-graduate education did 
you undertake? 
Diploaa(1) Masters(2) 
Doctorate(3) Other: (4) 
Where did you go for this course? 
Malaysia(1) Singapore(2) 
U.K.(3) Australia(4) 
New Zealand(5) Canada(6) 
U.S.A.(7) Other: (8) 
Which university or college did you attend? 
Malaya(1) Singapore(2) 
Other: (3) 
What was ytur main field of study? 
Arts(1) Social Science(2) 
Pure Science(3) Applied Science(4) 
Medical Science(5) Agricultural Science(6) 
Commerce(7) Home Science(8) 
What was the main language of instruction? 
English(1) Other: (2) 
In what year did you start the course? 
Was it on a full-time or part-time basis? 
Part-time(1) Full-time(2) 
What was the normal duration of the course 
(months)? 
When d'4 you stop attending the course? 
Did yo4 empt the final examination? 
No(1) es(2) 
[IF 'no o To Part III) 
Were you essful in that examination? 
No(1) (2) 
PAR III: JOB CLjCTFRISTICS 
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Manager or Senior Executive(1) 
Professional0 
Middle or Junipr Executive(3) 
Supervisory 1ork(4) 
Technical or Skilled Work(5) 














When did you start on your present 
position (month and year)? 
Did you receive any formal training for 
this present job? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
CIF 'no' Go To Question 5) 
Card Number 
Respondent Number 
Respondent Card Number 
4 Which of the following types of formal 
training did you receive for this present 
job and for how long (weeks)? 
Apprenticeship 
Formal Training Within Firm 
Specialised Training Institutions 
Overseas Training 
Other: 
What is your present monthly salary 
(gross)? 
How many months bonus are you likely to 
receive this year? 
How much overtime compensation will you 
earn this month? 
What is the percentage contribution made 
to the EPF by your employer? 
Is there a pension scheme in your firm and 














How much meal allowance do you expect to 
receive this month? 46-72- 
How much transport allowance do you expect 
to receive this month? 4T-47 
How much housing allowance do you expect to 





1-?.. How much insurance premium does your 
employer pay for you? 
How many days paid leave are you entitled 
per year? 
How many weeks medical leave are you 
entit1c,1 per year? 
Do you receive any other allowance 
(type and value)? 













When did you join your present firm or Month 
employer (month and year)? 6364 
Year 
6566 
Have you held the same job since then? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
ELF 
'no' Go To question 20 ] 
IF 'yes' Go To Question 22 
How many different jobs have you held in 
your present firm or with your present 
employer? 6869 
What was your first job or occupation with MOC 
your present employer? 7071 
Manager or Senior Executive(1) 
Professional(2) 
Middle or Junior Executive(3) 
Supervisory Work(4) 72 
Technical or Skilled Work(5) 




Did you work elsewhere before joining your 
present employer? 73 
No(1) Yes(2) 
[LF 'no' Go To Question 24] 
1. Card Number 
Respondent Number 
Respondent Card Number 
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WI,en did you start on your first full-time____ 
employment (month and year)? r. 
How long did you spend looking for your 
first full-tim employment (weeks)? 10 12 
What was your first full-time job or MOC 
occupation? OOOOOO 71-577 
Manager or Senior Executive(1) 
Professional(2) 
Middle or Junior Executive(3) 
Supervisory Work(4) 15 
Technical or Skilled Work(5) 




Where were you first employed on a full-time 
basis? 
Private Sector(1) 
Private Educational Institution(2) 
Public Sector(3) 
Public Educational Institution(4) 
International Organisation(5) 
Self-employed(6) 
In which of the following sector were you first 





How long did you stay in your first full-time 
occupation (months and years)? 
What was your first starting salary (gross)? 
How many employers have you had excluding 







Did you receive any form of formal 
training from your previous employer(s)? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
CIF 'no' Go To Question 33] 
Which of the following types of formal 
training did you receive and for how long 
(weeks)? 
Apprenticeship 
Formal Training within Firm 
Specialised Training Institution 
Overseas Training 
Other: 
Have you ever been unemployed since your 
first full-time employment? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
[ir 'no' Go To Question 35} 
What is the total length of unemployment 
which you have experienced since your first 
full-time employment (weeks)? 
Are you a member of a trade union? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
Do you have any wage bargaining in your 
present firm for workers in your category? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
PART IV: FAMILY PROFILE 
1. What is or was your father's occupation 
(specify)9 
Manager or Senior Executive(1) 
Professional(2) 
Middle or Junior Executive(3) 
Supervisory Work(4) 
Technical or Skilled Work(5) 















Where is or was your father employed? 
Private Sector(1) 53 
Private Educational Institution(2) 
Public Sector(3) 
Public Educational Institution(4) 
International Organisation(5) 
Self-employed 
Obn your father read and write? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
What is your father's highest level of 
education? 55 
No Education(1) Primary(2) 
Secondary(3) College(4) 
University(4) 
Is or was your mother working? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
[IF 'no' Go To Question 81 
What is or was your mother's occupationMOC 
(specify)9 7737 
Manager or Senior Executive(1) 
Professional(2) 
Middle or Junior Executive(3) 
Supervisory Work(4) 59 
Technical or Skilled Work(5) 




Where is or was your mother working? 
Private Sector(1) 
Private Educational Institution(2) 
Public 3ector(3) 
PUblic Educational Institution(4) 
International Organisation(5) 
Self-employed(6) 
Can your mother read and write? 
No(1) Yes(2) 
What is your mother's highest level of 
education? 




PART V: FIRM CHARACTERISTICS (Private Sector Obly) 
Firm Code 
Firm Employment Size 







PART VI: INTERVIEW COMMENTS 
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Regression Estimates of Structural Form of Earnings Functions: 
Females, Private Sector Sample 
cont'd 
Constant 3.812 3.730 
S -0.140a 11.276 -0.061 11.899 
(2.786) (1.258) 
S2 0.014a 138.164 0.011a 148.221 
(6.119) (5.279) 
Se 0.045 0.716 -0.081 0.889 (0.504) (0.729) 
0.144 0.761 0.171b 0.567 
(1.370) (2.139) 
Sa 
0.351a 0.127 0193b 0.313 
(2.670) (2.359) 
Sc 
0.082 0.433 0.011 0.631 
(0.924) (0.177) 
0.089a 4.396 0.097a 4.885 
(3.573) (5.296) 
t2 -0.001 31.713 -0.002c 38.055 
(0.794) (1.895) 
FT 0.101 0.119 0.091 0.092 
(0.932) (1.140) 
UNION -0.062 0.470 -0.107c 0.378 
(0.922) (2.012) 
FORFIRM 0.041 0.358 0.224a 0.350 
(0.530) (4.376) 
FIRhSIZE 0.0001 570.187 0.00008 457.281 
(1.140) (0.914) 





Mean of Mean of 
Race Malay Independent Chinese Independent 
Variable Variable. 
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Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
significant at the 0.01 level 
significant at the 0.05 level 




Race Malay Independent Chinese Independent 
Variable Variable 
SECSECT 0.667 0.485 0.195 0.318 
(1.517) (1.247) 
QUITS -0.025 0.500 -0.009 0.977 
(0.569) (0.493) 
MARRIED 0.047 0.351 0145b 0.286 
(0.625) (2.479) 
NODEP 0.017 1.672 0.009 1.134 
(1.239) (0.737) 
MED -0.002 3.470 0.002 3.290 
(0.215) (0.235) 
MOC 0.001 40.828 0.009 41.148 
(0.232) (1.545) 
FED 0.011 5.799 0.004 5.369 
(1.310) (0.700) 
FOC 0.006b 43.955 0.0004 40.590 
(2.144) (0.224) 
CE1 -0.094 0.343 -0.053 0.571 
(0.992) (0.793) 
FARSIZE 0.009 6.410 -0.002 5.926 
(0.752) (0.162) 
FLBCHILD -0.047 0.373 o.o4o 0.424 
(0.710) (0.825) 
-2 
R 0.818 0.783 
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RegresEion Estimates of Structural Form of Earnings Functions: 





Mean of Mean of 
Race Malay Independent Chinese Independent 
Variable Variable 
Constant 3.676 3.750 







0.348a 0.796 -0.006 0.512 
(4.746) (0.076) 







t 0.052a 6.593 0.068a 7.321 
(3.260) (4.374) 
-0.0007 66.141 -0.0004 78.443 
(0.841) (0.498) 
FT -0.061 0.197 -0.107c 0.141 
(1.125) (1.731) 
QUITS -0.156a 0.347 -0.158a 0.182 
(5.248) (3.869) 
MARRIED 0.187a 0.605 -0.003 0.686 
(3.628) (0.051) 
NUDEP 0.004 2.007 0.013 1.686 
(0.398) (1.038) 
MED 0.010 2.905 0.010 3.942 
(1.511) (1.578) 
moc 0.004 41.490 0.0004 41.422 
(0.829) (0.110) 
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Figures in parentheses are t-ratios 
significant at the 0.01 level 
significant at the 0.05 level 




Mean of Mean of 
Race Malay Independent Chinese Independent 
Variable Variable 
FED -0.002 5.796 -0.009 5.785 
(0.259) (1.449) 
FOC 0.001 42.735 0.002 40.579 
(0.708) (0.944) 
CE 0.141b 0.191 0.011 0.438 
1 
(2.437) (0.208) 
FAMSIZE -0.011 6.612 0.001 6.397 
(1.654) (0.165) 










Throughout this report the term 'Malaysia' is used in reference 
to 'Peninsular Malaysia' unless otherwise stated. 
The first c,..3nsus was taken in 1911. 
The period in question, n, is given by in in 2/r, where in 2 is the 
natural logarithm of 2 and r is the rate of population growth. 
Present trends indicate a mean annual rate of decline of 2.35 percent 
in total fertility; see Datin or Laily Aziz, et.al. 1979, op. 6-7. 
For a succint discussion of the definition of 'the uality of life' 
and the effects of population growth on the quality of life see 
Corsa and Oakley (1979). 
The incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) measures the amount of 
net investment required to generate a unit increase in GNP, i.e. 
ICOR = 8E/AY, where QK is net investment and ,AY the change 
in GNP. 
Part of the unemployment problem experienced by youths can be 
attributed to the world-wide economic recession that hit most 
countries in the 1970's. 
There is general agreement on the increase in inter-racial disparity 
although this is difficult to demonstrate conclusively; see Lim 
(1971), Hirschman (1974), and Snodgrass (1980). 
The first Five-Year Plan, 1956-60, was formulated in 1955, two years 
prior to independence, and its objectives are basically different 
from those of its successors. 
For details see Malaysia 1961, p. 16; 1966, p. 2; 1971, Chapter 4; 
and 1976, Chapters 1\and 4. 
This diagnosis is highly debatable; see for instance Loh (1975). 
On the structural hypothesis and its relevance to Malaysia see: 
a) Fisk (1962), b) Ungku Aziz (1964, 1965, 1967). On the 
cultural hypothesis see: a) Silcock (1965), b) Parkinson (1967), 
Esman (1972). For a succint summary of the arguments and their 
implications see Snodgrass (1980). 
Some biases must therefore be expected in the empirical analyses 
especially in cases where the education variable is represented by 
a continuous variable. It is unfortunately not possible to 
determine the extent of the biases. 
On the importance of this crucial assumption of perfect competition 
see Blaug (1972). 
Chapter II 
For some formal treatment of the screening hypothesis see Arrow 
(1973), Spence (1973), and Stiglitz (1975). 
The empirical results repOrted here have been published in another 
paper; see Lee (1980). 
For a formal exposition of the theory of optimal allocation of 
post-schooling investment in human capital, see Ben-Porath (1967). 
The introduction of interaction terms such as St and St2 also have 
a theoretical basis. The basic Mincerian semi-logarithmic earnings 
function yields a valid estimate of the rate of return to schooling 
per se only if post-schooling investment and the rate of return to 
post-schooling investment are independent of the amount of schooling. 
A necessary, though not sufficient, condition for this to be true 
is that the experience-earnings profiles are parallel for all 
educational levels. If this does not hold, an allowance must be 
made for it if the rates of return to schooling per se are to be 
identified. For further elaborations of this see Psacharopoulos 
and Layard (1979) and Lee (1980, Chapter 5). 
5ntilog (JS ) -J 100)7(s - s1)' where s -s 0, may be s2 
taken as an approximation of te marginal rate2of1return to schooling 
at each level; see Psacharopoulos and Layard (1979). 
Tests for the stability of the basic earnings function used here 
show that there are no significant differences between the coefficients 
of the two sub-samples and those of the comple samples. 
The use of dummy variables to represent MSSEE grades produced similar 
results. 
For a discussion of the underlying simultaneous equation system, 
the simultaneity problem, and the choice and theoretical rationale 
of the variables used see Lee ( 1980, Chapter 6). 
For further discussion see Goldberger (1964, pp. 197-200). 
The use of a continuous variable for formal training, on the whole, 
produced insignificant results; see Lee (1980, Tables 6.3 and 6.6, 
pp. 186, 204). 
Chapter III 
1 
Two broad categories of discrimination theories may be distinguished, 
i.e. the utility or taste hypothesis associated with Gary Becker 
(1971) and Kenneth Arrow (1970), and the crowding hypothesis 
associated with F.Y. Edgeworth (1922), Lester Thurow (1969), and 
Barbara Bergmann (1971). 
In fact the differences in endowments can also be evaluated by using 
the low-wage equation, but this produces an interaction term which 
has no obvious interpretation; see Blinder (1973). 
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11+0 
It has been shown that the differences between monthly salary 
and monthly earnings in terms of the rates of return to schooling, 
for instance, are not large; see Lee (1980, Chapters 4 to 7). 
These ratios differ slightly from the ratio of average monthly 
salary since they are based on the average natural log of monthly 
salary. The entire analysis here is in terms of the natural log 
of monthly salary. 
It has also been shown that the differences between monthly salary 
and monthly earnings in terms of the rates of returns to education, 
etc. are not large. However, the preference is for monthly earnings 
for the reasons given above. 
The analysis here is also conducted in terms of the natural log 
of moJt:ly ernings. 
Chapter IV 
For a discUssion of the issue of labour market segmentation and 
the determinants of upward intersegmental mobility see Lee (1980, 
Chapter 9). 
This model is a modified version of the model used by Leigh; 
see Leigh (1978). 
Data on subordinate office workers and unskilled workers in the 
Industrial and Manual Group were not available at the time of the 
survey. Senior Division One personnel, on the other hand, tend 
to exceed the age limit set for this study. 
The predominance of Malays in these occupations is due not only 
to differences in racial preferences but also to the provisions 
of the Federal Constitution. For instance, Article 153 of the 
Constitution sets a racial quota of four Malaya to one non-Malay 
in the Police Force. 
See Records Office, "Public Sector Manpower Survey, 1973u. 
Computer Printouts, Public Services Department, Kuala Lumpur. 
Chapter V 
The problem of poverty and unemployment may be categorised as the 
employment problem defined in terms of the need to create not 
merely more jobs but more jobs providing a minimum standard of 
living (see Seers, 1971). 
The objective of resolving the employment problem as defined in 
footnote one would be more encompassing than the objective of 
reducine the incidence of poverty and may be a more appropriate 
policy goal. 
Appendix I 
Cf. Department of Statistics, Business Expectations Survey: 
Peninsular Malaysia, First Quarter 1978, Kuala Lumpur: Department 
of Statistics, 1978. 
Department of Statistics, Survey of Manufacturing Industries, 
Peninsular Malaysia, 1972, Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 
1975. 
See: Economic Planning Unit, "Report of the Manpower Survey in 
Malaysia, 1973", mimeographed, Kuala Lumpur, 1975. 
Department of Statistics, Basic Population Tables, Volume 1, 
Kuala Lumpur, 1975. 
See W.G. Cochran, Sampling Techniques, Third Edition, New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1977, pp. 10-11. 
See Report of the Cabinet Committee Appointed by Cabinet to 
Examine the Revised Report of the Royal Salaries Commission, 1975, 
Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1977, p. 96. 
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